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HOSTILE TAKEOVER BIDS IN JAPAN?
UNDERSTANDING CONVERGENCE USING
THE LAYERED APPROACH
Michael Cody*
ABSTRACT
Hostile takeover bids arrived in Japan in 2005 and U.S. legal
scholars announced that their arrival offered strong evidence in sup-
port of corporate governance convergence to the U.S. shareholder-ori-
ented model.  Now, four years later, there has still not been a
successful hostile takeover bid and the practice has seemingly fallen
out of favor.  The Japanese experience with hostile takeover bids sug-
gests a much more complicated process is occurring than the one sug-
gested by the traditional convergence theories.
This article uses the arrival of hostile takeover bids in Japan to
explore a number of convergence theories, including: traditional theo-
ries, the economic version of selective adaptation, other theories of se-
lective adaptation, and a new theory—the “Layered Approach.”
The Layered Approach is based on previous selective adapta-
tion theories of Pitman Potter and Tom Ginsburg combined with in-
sights from institutional analysis from sociology.  It argues corporate
governance convergence happens in the following way: 1) economic
events trigger convergence, 2) corporate governance convergence is
more likely to occur among firms that operate in the same field (i.e.
global companies listed on public exchanges), 3) the speed and direc-
tion of convergence is affected by local social institutions, and 4) gov-
ernment and market participants play a significant and active role in
“selecting” which foreign corporate governance rules will be “adapted”
into the local corporate governance regime.
The conclusion of the article is that the Layered Approach bet-
ter explains the arrival and effect of hostile takeover bids in Japan
because it acknowledges that both economic and social factors had
roles to play.  In particular, the evidence shows local social institu-
tions, with local market participants, play an active role in determin-
* The author is a Ph.D. student at the University of British Columbia in Vancou-
ver, Canada.  This article was presented at the Pan-Pacific Business Law Confer-
ence in Vancouver, BC, September 29–30, 2006.  Special thanks to Masafumi
Nakahigashi, Yosihiro Yamada, Julian Dierkes, Christie Ford, Liljiana Buckovic
and Maclean Brodie for their insightful comments on previous drafts of this paper.
Extra special thanks to Yosihiro Yamada for providing me with translations of
some sources.  Any errors or omissions in the paper remain my own.
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ing the speed and direction of the changes to the Japanese corporate
governance system.
INTRODUCTION
In 2005, hostile takeover bids arrived in Japan in dramatic
fashion.  To date, there have been fifteen hostile takeover bid at-
tempts.1  At the time of their arrival, these attempts surprised many
Japanese scholars who believed that hostile bids would never be cul-
turally acceptable.2
Many legal scholars, favoring corporate governance conver-
gence theories akin to the U.S. shareholder-centric model, trumpeted
the arrival of hostile takeover bids in Japan.3  For example, in 2005,
U.S. legal scholar, Curtis Milhaupt, speculated that the arrival of hos-
tile takeover bids in Japan was the beginning of a developing market
for corporate control and that U.S. corporate law (particularly Dela-
ware corporate law) would make a strong contribution to its
development:
If, as now seems distinctly possible, the world’s second
largest economy is in the process of embracing hostile
M&A (however reluctantly), and along with it the core of
Delaware takeover jurisprudence, this development may
represent an epochal moment for Japan and for the
global standards movement in corporate governance.4
Some scholars even proposed these changes in Japan were part of a
larger process of bringing about the “Americanization” of Japanese
law.5
There is no doubt that the arrival of hostile takeover bids in
Japan took centre stage in a broad social and political debate about the
future of Japan.  After a fifteen year recession, Japanese society was
looking for something to waken its slumbering economy.6  Change was
coming.  The only question was: What type of change?  The debate
1 Each bid is summarized in the Appendix. See infra pp. 47–51.
2 See NEIL FLIGSTEIN, THE ARCHITECTURE OF MARKETS 187 (2001).
3 See Cristina Alger, Note, The Livedoor Looking Glass: Examining the Limits of
Hostile Takeover Bids in Japan, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 309, 317–18 (2006).
4 Curtis J. Milhaupt, In the Shadow of Delaware? The Rise of Hostile Takeovers in
Japan, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2171, 2173–74 (2005).
5 See generally R. Daniel Kelemen & Eric C. Sibbitt, The Americanization of Japa-
nese Law, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 269.
6 Current Japanese corporations are characterized by high levels of liquid assets
and management that is not accountable for financial performance.  Some view
hostile takeovers as a potential solution to both problems. See Symposium, The
Poison Pill in Japan: The Missing Infrastructure, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 21,
21–22 (2004).
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raged between supporters of the “old” Japan who wanted to maintain
the useful and unique portions of the existing Japanese corporate gov-
ernance system, and advocates for a “new” Japan who supported an
aggressive Westernized economy.7  In this larger societal context, hos-
tile takeover bids dominated the media, captivated Japanese society,
and became a microcosm of the larger debate between the “old” and
“new” Japan.
A small group of younger businessmen, dubbed the “Hills
Tribe” by the Japanese press because their companies were located in
the posh Roppongi Hills commercial complex in Tokyo,8 led the hostile
takeover movement in Japan.  The two most prominent members of
the “Hills Tribe” were Yoshiaki Murakami, the founder of M&A Con-
sulting9—a U.S. style aggressive investment fund—and Takafumi
Horie, the Chief Executive Officer of internet company Livedoor Co.
(“Livedoor”).10  These “mavericks” represented the new breed of Japa-
7 See Milhaupt, supra note 4, at 2181.  Examples of organizations that support the
“old” Japan viewpoint are Toyota Corp. and Canon Inc., who are known for want-
ing to maintain the good points of Japanese-style corporate management. See
Hisane Masaki, Japan: Another “Hills Tribesman” Brought Down, ASIA TIMES ON-
LINE, June 10, 2006, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/HF10Dh03.html.  Ex-
amples of individuals who support the “new” Japan are Yoshiaki Murakami and
Takafumi Horie. See infra notes 9–10 and accompanying text.
8 The Roppongi Hills commercial complex was built in 2003.  Many successful IT
industry firms have moved to the complex, “making it a symbol of success.”
Masaki, supra note 7.
9 Yoshiaki Murakami is a graduate of Tokyo University, the most prestigious uni-
versity in Japan.  Andrew Morse, Maverick’s Fall Portends Change, WALL ST. J.,
June 6, 2006, at C1.  He is a former government official, having worked at the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI, now called METI) for sixteen
years. Id.  For a description of the importance of this agency to Japan, see gener-
ally JOHNSON infra note 42.  When he left the ministry in 1999, Murakami founded
M&A Consulting, a U.S. style aggressive investment fund.  M&A Consulting
launched one of the first hostile takeover bids in Japan in 2000, when it made a
bid for Shoei Co. See Masaki, supra note 7.  For a description of this bid, see Ap-
pendix, infra pp. 47–51.  Murakami is the key individual supporting the hostile
takeover bid movement in Japan.  Murakami and M&A Consulting were involved
in four of the eleven hostile takeover bids in Japan.
10 Takafumi Horie also attended Tokyo University but did not graduate.  Yuka
Hayashi, Andrew Morse & Sebastian Moffett, Raw Deals: In Clubby Japan, A
Brash Raider Takes a Big Fall, WALL ST. J, Feb. 3, 2006, at A1.  He expanded his
Japanese internet company, Livedoor, by using a Western style growth-through-
acquisition strategy.  At its peak, Livedoor was worth over $8 billion. See Jim
Frederick, Feeding Frenzy: Livedoor May Be in Ruins, but Its Acquisition Hungry
Approach Lives On, TIME ASIA, Feb. 6, 2006, at 41, available at http://www.time.
com/time/asia/magazine/article/0,13673,501060206-1154258,00.html.
\\server05\productn\R\RGL\9-1\RGL101.txt unknown Seq: 4  2-FEB-10 13:28
4 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 9:1
nese entrepeneurs who supported an aggressive style of business that
primarily focused on profits.11
The highpoint of the hostile takeover movement came in dra-
matic fashion on February 8, 2005, when Horie’s upstart internet com-
pany, Livedoor, announced a hostile bid for Nippon Broadcasting
System Inc. (“Nippon Broadcasting”), a radio-broadcasting firm affili-
ated with Japan’s largest media conglomerate, the Fuji Sankei Media
Group.12  On January 17, 2005, Fuji TV, the parent company, made an
offer for all of the shares of Nippon Broadcasting.13  In the midst of
that bid, Livedoor made the surprising announcement that it had ac-
quired thirty-eight percent of the Nippon Broadcasting shares, and
that it intended to make an offer for the remainder of the shares.14
Livedoor’s share purchases were financed by an issuance of $750 mil-
lion “death spiral” convertible bonds underwritten by Lehman Broth-
ers, a United States investment bank.15
On February 23, 2005, the board of Nippon Broadcasting re-
sponded to Livedoor’s bid by issuing a substantial number of warrants
(shin kabu yoyaku ken) to Fuji TV to dilute Livedoor’s stock ownership
below twenty-percent.16  Nippon Broadcasting maintained that re-
maining part of the Fuji Sankei group would provide long-term bene-
fits to shareholders.17  Livedoor successfully sued to enjoin the
issuance of the warrants.18  The situation was eventually resolved am-
icably in a familiar Japanese fashion through a cross-shareholding ar-
rangement on April 18, 2005, when Livedoor sold all of its Nippon
shares to Fuji TV.19  Fuji TV purchased a reciprocal two and a half
11 See Kanako Takahara, JAPAN: Murakami Arrested Over Insider Trading, JA-
PAN TIMES, June 6, 2006, available at http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?
parentid=47220.
12 Japan: Livedoor ups Broadcaster State, The JAPAN TIMES, Feb. 22, 2005, availa-
ble at http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article-eastasia.asp?parentid=21060.
13 The bid was necessary to cure an anomalous shareholding situation because
Nippon owned 22.5% of the shares of its parent, Fuji TV, but Fuji TV owned only
12.5% of Nippon shares.  Fuji Television Network, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter,
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 78,921 (Jan. 18, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/
divisions/marketreg/mr-noaction/sullivan010605.htm.
14 See Japan: Livedoor ups Broadcaster State, supra note 12.
15 Hostile Takeovers: Shaking up Corporate Japan, ECONOMIST, Mar. 23, 2005
at 61, available at http://www.economist.com/businessfinance/PrinterFriendly.cfm
?story_id=3793297 (explaining the death spiral bonds gave Lehman the right to
convert the bonds into shares at a constant discount to the share price).
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Milhaupt, supra note 4, at 2179–80 (explaining how Livedoor sold its shares for
a value roughly equal to its cost and therefore did not profit from the transaction).
\\server05\productn\R\RGL\9-1\RGL101.txt unknown Seq: 5  2-FEB-10 13:28
2010] HOSTILE TAKEOVER BIDS IN JAPAN? 5
percent stake in Livedoor, and the three companies established a joint
committee to explore related ventures.20
With this bid, the Japanese hostile takeover movement started
with great promise, accompanied by predictions of a wave of hostile
bids sweeping across Japan which would aid in jumpstarting the econ-
omy.21  Less than four years later, the movement appears to have
stalled, if not ended, since there have been no successful hostile bids.22
The expected wave of takeovers never materialized, and the two most
prominent leaders of the new aggressive style of business in Japan
have both been jailed.23  Takafumi Horie was sentenced to two and a
half years for fraudulently manipulating the financial statements of
Livedoor.24  Yoshiaki Murakami was arrested for insider trading in re-
lation to Livedoor’s bid for Nippon Broadcasting and has been sen-
tenced to two years in jail and fined 1.15 billion yen.25  Murakami was
found guilty of persuading Horie to make the bid for Nippon Broad-
casting after buying Nippon Broadcasting shares in his Murakami
Fund,26 and then selling his position on the rise in share price after
the bid was launched.27
20 See generally, Alger supra note 3.
21 See Hostile Takeovers:  Shaking up Corporate Japan, supra note 15, at 61 (al-
though, many of the articles with these predictions originated in western
countries).
22 For a discussion on how bids end in the typical Japanese fashion of cross-share-
holding, see Alger, supra note 3, at 315.
23 Hostile takeovers continue to happen at the pace of 2–3 a year. Id.
24 On January 18, 2006, Japanese officers raided Livedoor’s offices and Horie’s
home on suspicion of securities fraud.  On January 23, 2006 Takafumi Horie and
three other Livedoor executives were arrested on suspicion of fraudulently
manipulating the financial statements of Livedoor so that the share price would
rise. Horie resigned as the CEO of Livedoor the next day and Livedoor’s stock
plummeted 80%. See Frederick, supra note 10; see also Murakami’s Arrest Comes R
as a Sober Reminder of Need for Discipline on Markets in Japan, FOREIGN PRESS
CENTER JAPAN, June 14, 2006, available at http://www.fpcj.jp/old/e/mres/japan
brief/jb_634.html.
25 Murakami was accused of making somewhere between three and ten billion yen
from the sale of Nippon Broadcasting shares based on insider knowledge that
Livedoor was going to launch a bid. See Masaki, supra note 7; see also Takahara,
supra note 11.
26 Takahara, supra note 11 (discussing how Murakami’s fund had 400 billion yen
in assets, and that the fund made most of its capital from overseas, particularly
United States, investors).
27 Murakami admitted he met with Horie and Livedoor executives in September
and urged them to buy Nippon Broadcasting shares.  Murakami’s fund eventually
ended holding almost 20% of Nippon Broadcasting shares. See Takahara, supra
note 11; Masaki, supra note 7.
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At the time of the arrests, it was not clear whether the new
aggressive style of business in Japan, including hostile takeover bids,
would survive or simply become a part of Japanese business history.
The following quotes from the Japanese press illustrate the impor-
tance of these events to the future of Japanese corporate governance:
The question now: Will the rough-and-tumble style of
capitalism that Horie pioneered be another, more far-
reaching casualty of this debacle?28
Horie and Murakami, who became champions of the
times and drew praise for their seemingly commendable
acts to shake up the self-complacency of corporate gov-
ernance in Japan, are now being condemned for “be-
traying the market and investing public” with their
illegal practices.  The public’s anger and feeling of being
betrayed by the two men appears to be all the stronger
because they managed to make themselves heroes by
speaking of respectable causes. There is a persistent un-
dercurrent of opinions that values the two men’s conduct
in that they had made a considerable impact on the tepid
traditional corporate governance. . .29
In its lengthy editorial on June 12 titled “Toward a Mar-
ket Society with Discipline”, the Asahi Shimbun com-
mented on Murakami’s wrongdoing: “It carries a grave
meaning which is not limited to mere economic crime,
since this could determine the direction in which Japa-
nese society will head in the future.”30
Since the arrests, there have been a small number of hostile takeover
bid attempts, mostly by U.S. investment fund Steel Partners.31  None
have been successful.
From a North American perspective, the arrival of hostile take-
over bids in Japan is interesting because it offers insight into the de-
bate about worldwide corporate governance convergence. Corporate
governance convergence theories have traditionally associated them-
selves with one of two opposing positions, convergence or divergence.
The convergence theories contend that due to the competitive forces of
economic efficiency there will be a global convergence in corporate gov-
28 Frederick, supra note 24, at 1. R
29 FOREIGN PRESS CENTER JAPAN, supra note 24, at 2.
30 Id. at 3.
31 The bids include: Oiji Paper’s bid for Hokuetsu Paper Mills, Aoki Holdings Bid
for Futata, Steel Partners bid for Myojo Foods, Steel Partners Bid for Bulldog
Sauce, Davinci Advisors bid for TOC Co. and Steel Partners bid for Sapporo. See
infra Appendix pp. 47–51.
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ernance rules towards the Anglo-American shareholder oriented
model.32  Divergence theories generally argue that local institutions or
culture will cause divergence as opposed to convergence; or, alterna-
tively, at least make convergence unlikely.33
The arrival of hostile takeover bids in Japan initially seemed to
provide evidence in support of the convergence theories because noth-
ing could be more consistent with the U.S. shareholder form of corpo-
rate governance than hostile takeover bids.  However, the latest
developments seem to provide evidence against convergence.  More im-
portantly, the set of events that led to the arrival of hostile takeover
bids in Japan suggest something more complicated than convergence
or divergence is going on.  Some corporate governance convergence is
happening in Japan but Japanese society is blending foreign corporate
governance institutions with its own domestic institutions to develop
something uniquely Japanese.  In short, takeover bids have arrived in
Japan, but they do not look or work the same way as North American
hostile takeovers.  Recently, a few scholars have used the concept of
“selective adaptation” to explain this more complicated process, and
32 See discussion of convergance theories infra Part 1.
33 The most well known theory is Lucian Bebchuk and Mark Roe’s theory of path
dependence which argues that political forces and the historical path of develop-
ment in a society will limit the ability of the competitive forces to cause corporate
convergence and that the “corporate structures that an economy has at any point
in time are likely to depend on those that it had at earlier times.”  Lucian Bebchuk
& Mark Roe, A Theory of Path Dependency in Corporate Ownership and Govern-
ance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 169 (1999); see also Sanford M. Jacoby, Corporate Gov-
ernance in Comparative Perspective: Prospects for Convergence, 22 COMP. LAB. L. &
POL’Y J. 5, 16–17 (2000) (examining a theory of path dependence as applied to the
Japanese economy).  Mark West performed an empirical study on Japanese and
U.S. corporate laws and found that the two corporate laws are actually diverging
and not converging.  This study was only made possible because of the odd histori-
cal fact that the Japanese Commercial Code was based on the Illinois Business
Corporation Act of 1933.  West argued that the divergence was likely caused by a
difference in the institutions in Japan – primarily the lack of competition among
domestic firms and the reliance on exogenous shocks to stimulate regulatory
change. See Mark D. West, The Puzzling Divergence of Corporate Law: Evidence
and Explanations from Japan and the United States, U. PA. L. R. 527, 601 (2001).
The criticism of divergence theories is that they appear to argue that convergence
of corporate governance regimes is not possible or that changes are possible only
within a narrow band.  However, history has shown this is clearly not the case
because there is some convergence happening, at least among global publicly
traded companies.  The arrival of hostile takeover bids in Japan is a perfect exam-
ple of this.
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one theory attempts to combine all of these insights into a “Layered
Approach.”34
This article explores the ability of the three different theoreti-
cal frameworks from the corporate governance convergence literature
to explain the arrival of hostile takeover bids in Japan. The
frameworks are: The traditional economic convergence theories, the
more recent selective adaptation theories, and the Layered
Approach.35
The analysis in this article is organized into six sections.  First,
the traditional convergence theories are discussed.  Second, the eco-
nomic theory of selective adaptation is discussed.  Third, the alternate
version of selective adaptation based on sociology and cultural analysis
is discussed.  Fourth, the Layered Approach to convergence is dis-
cussed.  Fifth, a historical and institutional account of the arrival of
hostile takeovers in Japan is provided.  Sixth, the different theories
are compared to determine which theory better explains the Japanese
experience.  Finally, the article concludes by suggesting the Layered
Approach is preferred, and predicts where the Japanese corporate gov-
ernance system is likely to go in the future and whether the expected
wave of hostile takeover bids will materialize.
PART 1 – CONVERGENCE THEORIES
A. The Theories
Corporate governance convergence theories contend that due to
the competitive forces of economic efficiency there will be a global con-
vergence in corporate governance rules towards the Anglo-American
shareholder oriented model.  The strong-form of convergence theory
was argued by Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman in 2001.36
They predicted “the end of history” for corporate law because, in their
view, global ideological convergence on the U.S. shareholder oriented
corporate governance model had already occurred.  They went so far as
to say:
There is no longer any serious competitor to the view
that corporate law should principally strive to increase
34 See Michael Cody, Corporate Governance Reform in the People’s Republic of
China: the Layered Approach to Convergence, 3 CORP. GOV. L. R. NO. 4, 366 (2007)
(describing the layered approach).
35 The divergence theories will not be discussed in this paper because the arrival
of hostile takeover bids in Japan suggest that some level of convergence is occur-
ring.  Two different versions of selective adaptation are discussed in this article:
one based on economic analysis; the other based on cultural and sociological analy-
sis. See discussion of convergence theories infra Part 1.
36 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law,
89 GEO. L.J. 439, 455 (2001).
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long-term shareholder value.  This emergent consensus
has already profoundly affected corporate governance
practices throughout the world.  It is only a matter of
time before its influence is felt in the reform of corporate
law as well.37
The softer version of the convergence theory is offered by John
Coffee who argues that there will be some convergence in the corporate
governance regulations of the largest publicly traded companies, even
if corporate law convergence may not happen.38
B. Critiques of Convergence Theories
The major criticism of both convergence theories is that they
are very Western.  In fact, the convergence theories are part of a larger
set of economic based Western centric theories that assume superiority
of the Anglo-American capitalist economic system.  The larger set of
economic theories include: the globalization theory which claims that
inevitable economic forces are more powerful than nation states,39 the
rights hypothesis of new institutional economics (NIE) which claims
that enforceability of contract rights and security of private property
37 Id. at 439.
38 John C. Coffee & Adolf A. Berle, The Future as History: The Prospects for Global
Convergence in Corporate Governance and its Implications, 140 (Columbia Law
Sch. Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 144, 1999), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=142833.
39 See generally MARTIN WOLF, WHY GLOBALIZATION WORKS (2004); JAGDISH
BHAGWATI, in DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION (2004). The globalization theory is also
heavily criticized by scholars. See, e.g., PITMAN B. POTTER, THE CHINESE LEGAL
SYSTEM: GLOBALIZATION AND LOCAL LEGAL CULTURE 5 (2001) (hereinafter CHINESE
LEGAL SYSTEM) (“While the capacity of the liberal industrial economies to promote
visions of globalization derives as much from political and economic power as from
the inherent wisdom of the ideas themselves, there is little doubt that the influ-
ence of liberal ideals of private property have spread dramatically in the past dec-
ade. . . . [L]iberal legal norms associated with globalization constitute a belief
system driven by changing historical conditions of socio-economic and political re-
lations in Europe and North America.  The essentially one-way direction by which
these norms are disseminated around the world reflects the imbalances in political
and economic power between developed and developing economies that character-
ize the current dynamic of globalization.”); see also JOHN RALSTON SAUL, THE COL-
LAPSE OF GLOBALISM AND THE REINVENTION OF THE WORLD (2005).  For an older
critique of the theories of economic free trade and mercantilism see generally KARL
POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF
OUR TIME (2d ed. 2001) (arguing that when these types of economic theories are
allowed to dominate society, bad consequences result; and that the consequences
of 19th century mercantilism included the World War I, the Great Depression, and
the rise of fascism and communism).
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rights are both necessary for economic development,40 and the law and
finance literature which claims that common law legal systems are su-
perior to civil law legal systems for supporting a market economy.41
The common theme of these theories is that global convergence on the
Anglo-American economic model is inevitable because of economic
competitive pressures.  The convergence theories tend to ignore the
fact that economies with very different institutional structures from
Anglo-American economies have shown the ability to grow.  In some
cases, those economies have grown at a rate far exceeding the growth
of Anglo-American countries.  Japan is a prime example.42  Another
criticism of the convergence theories is that they tend to ignore the
role that local culture and institutions play in structuring the economy
and determining corporate governance structures.43
A final criticism of convergence theories is they are too simplis-
tic because they ignore the role that individual actors (both individuals
and governments) play in the convergence process—both in the selec-
tion of which foreign corporate governance institutions to adopt and
the way in which those institutions are interpreted by individuals.  In
other words, the process of adapting foreign legal institutions into a
local culture is a far more complicated process than the convergence
theories present.
40 See generally DOUGLASS NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY
20–21 (1981) (hereinafter STRUCTURE AND CHANGE) (describing the NIE);
DOUGLASS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORM-
ANCE (1990) (hereinafter INSTITUTIONS); Donald Clarke, Economic Development
and the Rights Hypothesis: The China Problem, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 89 (2003) (criti-
cizing the Rights Hypothesis).
41 See generally Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52
J. FIN. 1131 (1997); Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON.
1113 (1998).
42 For examples of studies highlighting the different institutional structures of
these economies and the way those institutional structures contributed to hyper-
economic growth, see generally, DOUG GUTHRIE, DRAGON IN A THREE PIECE SUIT
(1999); CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE (1982); EUN MEE
KIM, BIG BUSINESS, STRONG STATE (1997); Gary Hamilton, Organization and Mar-
ket Process in Taiwan’s Capitalist Economy, in THE ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION OF
EAST ASIAN CAPITALISM  237, 237–93 (Marco Orru´, Nicole W. Biggart, & Gary G.
Hamilton eds., 1997).
43 See Donald Clarke, Puzzling Observations in Chinese Law: When is a Riddle
just a Mistake? in UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
JEROME A. COHEN (C. Stephen Hsu ed., 2003).
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C. The Evidence in Japan
Curtis Milhaupt has recently written about how the arrival of
hostile takeover bids in Japan provides evidence in support of conver-
gence theories:
To date, developments in Japan provide powerful – even
astonishing evidence in support of the strong conver-
gence theory.  One way to interpret these developments
is that intellectual convergence on the shareholder-ori-
ented model, propelled by novel transactions, driven by
overriding concerns for financial returns, is gradually
breaking down resistance to change, and inexorably
drawing Japan’s corporate governance institutions closer
to those of the United States. Indeed, the Japanese situa-
tion appears to be playing out in much the way that
Professors Hansmann and Kraakman have suggested:
“As shareholding patterns become more homogenous (as
we expect they will), and as corporate cultures every-
where become more accommodating of takeovers (as it
seems destined to do), takeovers presumably will become
much more common in Europe, Japan and elsewhere.”44
However, Milhaupt acknowledges that, at a closer look, there is
something much more complicated going on than the traditional con-
vergence theories suggest:
In all likelihood, however, the transplantation of Dela-
ware takeover jurisprudence and the poison pill will lead
to neither strong convergence nor to path-dependent
blockage of further reforms. Rather, preliminary evi-
dence suggests that Delaware law will be adapted by the
judiciary and other actors to suit local interests – indeed,
a struggle for the “proper” interpretation of Delaware
takeover jurisprudence in Japan is already taking shape.
This struggle may well lead to a new governance regime,
but its contours may look quite different from those in the
United States.45
44 Milhaupt, supra note 4, at 2203 (quoting Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraak-
man, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO L.J. 439, 457–58 (2001)).
45 Id. at 2176 (emphasis added); see also id. at 2212 (explaining that, Milhaupt
believes that convergence theories are not very good explanatory tools, “[y]et col-
lectively, the convergence and law and finance literature still offer a rather anemic
account of how corporate law evolves and why it matters to economic success.”); id.
at 2209 (“Legal transplants are always tenuous experiments, and this particular
transplant may be especially unpredictable.  Japan has borrowed, not a single le-
gal rule or procedural mechanism, but a complex body of common law principles
and a sophisticated legal technology in the shareholder rights plan, which evolved
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The remainder of this article uses the experience in Japan to
explore this more complicated process of corporate convergence.
PART 2 – THE ECONOMIC VERSION OF SELECTIVE
ADAPTATION THEORY
Curtis Milhaupt introduced an economic version of “selective
adaptation” theory to explain the arrival of hostile takeover bids in
Japan in 2005.46  In that article, he argued the experience in Japan
did not support the traditional convergence theories because the bor-
rowing of foreign law in successful economies tends to be highly piece-
meal and selective.47  To accommodate this fact he offered a theory of
selective adaptation.  He summarized the theory in the following way:
The important dynamics at work in this Japanese exper-
iment are masked by the prevailing analytical constructs
in the comparative corporate governance literature.  In
practice, successful economies do not abandon their insti-
tutions for foreign models.  Rather, foreign legal technol-
ogies are selectively adopted locally, then adapted by
coalitions of market and governmental actors to suit
their own interests.  The potential to enhance share-
holder protections is one motivation for the foreign bor-
rowing, but many other motivations are also at work.
The result is not so much a convergence of systems on the
Anglo-American model as the unsettling telescoping and
stacking of borrowed legal institutions on top of domestic
governance structures.48
Milhaupt’s selective adaptation focuses on how foreign legal in-
stitutions are telescoped (selected) and stacked (adapted) with local le-
gal institutions:
In practice, borrowed rules (and the home country expe-
rience surrounding their formation and interpretation)
are telescoped into a convenient or politically palatable
package and stacked atop existing institutions in the
host country.  Only through repeated strategic and adap-
tive responses by local actors are the new rules and old
institutions eventually welded together into something
functionally operative.  By that point, the result is inevi-
tably distinct from both the borrowed rule as it operated
through an iterative process of strategic and adaptive responses over two decades
in tandem with market developments.”).
46 See, e.g., id. at 2171.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 2176–77.
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in the home country and the pre-existing institution in
the host country.49
Milhaupt’s theory of selective adaptation offered three very sig-
nificant advances in convergence theory.  First, he recognized that
there is a very complicated process taking place where foreign institu-
tions are combined with local institutions for new effect.  Second, he
recognized that the convergence process was not inevitable and that
participants (both individuals and governments) have a role to play in
directing the changes.  Third, his use of institutional analysis offered a
fuller contextual explanation of the convergence process than the more
simplistic traditional convergence theories where the structural differ-
ences between two societies are assumed away so that the analysis can
focus on economic efficiency.
Notwithstanding these important advances, Milhaupt’s theory
has a significant weakness.  He uses a narrow understanding of what
constitutes an institution. His definition of institution is taken from
new institutional economics (NIE),50 and, in particular, the work of
Douglass North.51  NIE defines institutions in a Western way.  It rec-
ognizes only the institutions that supported the economic growth of
Anglo-American societies.52  North’s definition of institutions is: “a set
of rules, compliance procedures, and moral and ethical behavioral
norms designed to constrain the behavior of individuals in the inter-
ests of maximizing the wealth or utility of principals.”53
Examples of NIE institutions are enforceable contract rights
and private property rights.  For example, Milhaupt identified the in-
stitution of poor information disclosure in Japan.54  The goal of NIE
analysis is to argue domestic institutions that differ from Western in-
stitutions should be replaced by Western institutions to stimulate eco-
49 Id. at 2213–14.
50 CURTIS MILHAUPT & MARK D. WEST, ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN: THE IMPACT OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL RULES 1 (2004);
GLOBAL MARKETS, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS: CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN A
NEW ERA OF CROSS-BORDER DEALS (Curtis Milhaupt ed., 2003) (providing exam-
ples of Milhaupt’s other work with NIE and comparative corporate governance).
51 See generally STRUCTURE AND CHANGE, supra note 40; INSTITUTIONS, supra note
40.
52 NIE is not capable of recognizing social institutions.  An example in the Japa-
nese context is the Japanese institution of “administrative guidance.” A full under-
standing of the convergence process is not possible without taking these social
institutions into account. See infra pp. 37–41 (describing how administrative gui-
dance affects the convergence process).
53 STRUCTURE AND CHANGE, supra note 40, at 201–02 (emphasis added).
54 See MILHAUPT & WEST, supra note 50, at 135.
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nomic growth.55  By definition, the advantage of initially identifying
the domestic institution is lost because of the theoretical framework’s
inability to understand the institution in its own local and cultural
context.
In effect, the NIE definition of institution predetermines the
outcome of any analysis that uses it.  In a simplistic way, it is like
conducting an analysis to determine who is more American:  the Japa-
nese, the Chinese, or the Americans?  Even more to the point, after
acknowledging the importance of institutional analysis or the cultural
differences between the Japanese, the Chinese, and the Americans,
the researcher still runs a study to determine who is most American.
What if the other societies have social, instead of economic, goals that
they take into account when deciding how to structure their societies,
such as the preservation of social stability or specific social institutions
like lifetime employment or a seniority wage system?56  Those social
goals cannot be accommodated within the NIE institutional frame-
work.  Therefore, for institutional analysis to work in an analysis of
Japan, it must be used outside of the economic paradigm.  When the
broader sociological definition of institutions is adopted, the institu-
tions identified by institutional analysis can be understood from the
cultural perspective of the society that created them and not through
the lens of Anglo-American economic analysis.57
55 For example, Milhaupt wrote that the role of Delaware law in global corporate
governance convergence may be in its ability to help break down domestic institu-
tions:  “Thus, in both systems, corporate law has crucially served to coordinate the
expectations of market participants during phases of institutional transition.  This
role for corporate law has been largely overlooked in the comparative corporate
governance literature, which has become fixated on minority shareholder protec-
tions. Returning to the discussion of convergence, gravitation toward Delaware
corporate law may signal recognition in other countries, at least implicitly, that its
main features are suited to playing this central role in efficient economic adapta-
tion.  Serving as a focal point for market and institutional change may in fact be
one of the most important ways in which corporate law matters to successful econo-
mies.”  Milhaupt, supra note 4, at 2215 (emphasis added).
56 These institutions are disappearing in Japan. See Christina Ahmadjian &
Gregory Robbins, A Clash of Capitalisms: Foreign Shareholders and Corporate
Restructurings in 1990s Japan, 70 AM. SOC. REV. 451 (2005).
57 A similar argument was made with respect to the application of institutional
analysis to China. See Michael Cody, Selective Adaptation and Corporate Govern-
ance Reform in the P.R.C. (on file with author).  Institutionalist W. Richard Scott
shares this perspective.  In writing about the changes occurring to Chinese enter-
prises he stated: “In short, the changes underway are more profound than is sug-
gested by a narrow focus on property rights or incentives, involving fundamental
changes in the types of social actors – both individual and collective-regarded as
legitimate and in the institutional logics that govern their actions. Indeed, the
prevailing focus on ‘property rights’ seems to me to be inappropriate for the Chi-
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PART 3 – OTHER THEORIES OF SELECTIVE ADAPTATION
Two theories of selective adaptation predated Milhaupt’s the-
ory.  Neither was based on economic analysis.  Pitman Potter offered
the first of these theories in 2001, in his work on the legal reforms
occurring in China.58  The second was proposed by Tom Ginsburg in
2002 in his work comparing the current set of reforms in Japan with
the reforms of the Meiji era.59
Potter’s work was motivated by the mistaken belief in Western
societies that the legal reforms undertaken in China in the 1990s were
the beginning of a broad movement toward the acceptance of Western
institutions, and that political reforms would follow shortly thereafter.
This belief was based on the fact that some of the terminology used in
the reforms was familiar to Westerners, for example, “corporations.”
Potter argued this was a mistaken assumption that would lead to frus-
tration for foreigners doing business in China.60  Potter’s book, The
Chinese Legal System: Globalization and Local Legal Culture, was an
attempt to explain how China adapts international norms to local con-
ditions.  In it he offered his theory of selective adaptation.  He argued
local legal culture61 affects the adoption of foreign legal institutions
and that China was not a “blank slate upon which can be written the
nese context.” See W. Richard Scott, The Changing World of Chinese Enterprise:
An Institutional Perspective, in THE MANAGEMENT OF ENTERPRISES IN THE PEO-
PLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 59, 70 (Anne Tsui & Chang Ming Lau eds., 2002).
58 Potter developed his theory of Selective Adaptation in the following works: CHI-
NESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 39; Globalization and Economic Regulation in
China: Selective Adaptation of Globalized Norms and Practices, 2 WASH. U.
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 119 (2003) (hereinafter Globalization and Economic Regula-
tion); LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA: INSTITUTIONS, CULTURE, AND SELECTIVE ADAPTA-
TION, 29 LAW AND SOC. INQUIRY 465 (2004) (hereinafter LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA).
59 Tom Ginsburg, Japanese Legal Reform in Historical Perspective (on file with
author).
60 See Clarke, supra note 43, at 93 (“For a Western-trained lawyer encountering
Chinese law for the first time, a reaction other than perplexity is a bad sign – it
means that one has not really grasped the depth of the problem of
understanding.”).
61 Potter identifies two components of local Chinese legal culture: Official legal
culture which reflects the norms of instrumentalism (laws and regulations are in-
struments of policy; law can be used as a tool for social change) and formalism (the
content of law is assumed to represent reality or that there are no gaps between
the content of the law and the operation of the law); and popular norms which
reflect the preference for informal relationships and autonomy (preference for ex-
tra-legal mechanisms to accomplish goals to protect parties from state intrusion
e.g. guanxi). See CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 39, at 11–15.  Potter’s theory
relies heavily on the concept of local legal culture to explain the Chinese-specific
aspects of Chinese society.  For the purposes of this paper, the concept of social
institutions will be preferred over the concept of local legal culture because institu-
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normative preferences of the regime, imported or otherwise.”62  Pot-
ter’s theory of selective adaptation argued that local actors and culture
select which components of foreign laws to implement:
Selective adaptation describes a process by which foreign
ideas are received and assimilated into local condi-
tions. . . societies engage in selective adaptation as a cop-
ing strategy for balancing local regulatory imperatives
with requirements of compliance with foreign norms
largely derived from the regimes of liberal democratic
capitalism. . . This involves a complex process of selec-
tively adapting foreign norms to local needs.  In contrast
to ideologies of convergence, suggesting development to-
ward a unified system, of institutional practices, selec-
tive adaptation is a useful perspective for examining the
interplay or difference and conformity in the interaction
between the global and the local.63
The extent of the implementation of foreign norms (or selectiv-
ity) depends on three elements: perception, complementarity and legit-
imacy.  Perception refers to local actors understanding about the
foreign institutions to be imported and their origins and implications.
Complementarity refers to the process through which the foreign insti-
tution is combined with the local institution to create a new institution
that remains true to local values.  Legitimacy refers to the extent to
which local actors support the purposes and consequences of the selec-
tive adaptation process.64
tions are much easier to define than culture.  Potter himself admits to the difficul-
ties of trying to define culture. See id.
62 Id. at 6.  This view is also shared by Chinese legal scholars. See, e.g., Sibao
Shen, China’s New Corporate Governance Measures After its Accession into the
WTO, 17 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 6, 6–7 (2004) (“However, people in China are likely to
see issues of corporate governance in accordance with their own ways of thinking;
this will be heavily influenced by traditional Chinese culture so that corporate
governance, as a borrowed notion, may face many pitfalls created by such thinking
and behavior.  Thus, there is a clash between the original definition of corporate
governance and Chinese traditional values. This is one of the root causes of the
many imperfections that can be found in relation to corporate governance in
China.”).
63 Globalization and Economic Regulation, supra note 58, at 119–21.
64 Potter provides the following description of the three components:
Perception determines understanding (and misunderstanding)
about foreign and local regulatory norms and their origins and
implications.  Thus, perceptions about the purpose, content, and
effect of foreign and local regulatory norms may determine the
focus and parameters for selection and adaptation.  Complemen-
tarity describes a circumstance by which apparently contradic-
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Tom Ginsburg also described the tendency for Japanese society
to selectively adapt foreign legal institutions from other countries.65
His theory is based largely on his historical analysis comparing the
reforms of the Meiji era (1868–1905) with the reforms of the current
Heisei era.  From his analysis he concluded, “Japan’s legal history has
involved a series of adaptations of foreign institutions into domestic
soil.”66  Ginsburg argued external forces or foreign pressure may initi-
ate reforms, but internal forces, particularly domestic business inter-
ests in the case of Japan, quickly took over direction of the reforms.67
For Ginsburg, the existence of the internal direction of reforms is im-
portant because rather than adopting foreign legal institutions carte
blanche in response to foreign pressure, he argues that internal forces
direct changes and “[t]he emphasis on selective adaptation empowers
those doing the selecting.”68
PART 4 – THE LAYERED APPROACH
The layered approach to convergence uses the levels of analysis
concept from institutional analysis in sociology to combine insights
from the economic, selective adaptation, and other convergence theo-
ries for a more complete explanation of how the corporate governance
convergence process works.  The levels of analysis concept acknowl-
edges that all social phenomena are complex and that no single theory
is sufficiently sophisticated to explain the entirety of any social pro-
tory priorities are combined for new effect, while still preserving
essential characteristics of each component.  In the context of ec-
onomic regulation, the effectiveness of selective adaptation may
depend on the capacity to combine local and foreign regulatory
norms in ways that address globally derived challenges while re-
maining true to established local values.  Legitimacy reflects the
extent to which members of local communities support the pur-
poses and consequences of selective adaptation.  While the forms
and requirements of legitimacy may vary with time, space, and
context, the effectiveness of selectively adapted regulatory norms
depends to an important degree on legitimacy of the content and
process of selection.
Id. at 119–21.
65 See generally Ginsburg, supra note 59.
66 Id. at 24.
67 Id. at 29.  Ahmadjian and Robinson reached the same result in their empirical
study of the de-institutionalization of lifetime employment in Japan. See
Christina L. Ahmadjian & Patricia Robinson, Safety in Numbers: Downsizing and
the Deinstitutionalization of Permanent Employment in Japan, 46 ADMINISTRATIVE
SCIENCE QUARTERLY, Dec. 2001, at 622.  For further arguments that external
forces or “exogenous shocks” cause changes in Japan, see generally West, supra
note 33. R
68 Ginsburg, supra note 59, at 28.
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cess, including corporate governance convergence.  The concept ac-
knowledges that different theories better explain different levels of
analysis, and it is acceptable to combine them in a blended approach.69
The levels of analysis that are relevant to convergence are:
1. Individual actor level
2. Social structure or institutional level
3. Societal level
The layered approach is based on a sociological definition of so-
cial institution that is broad and free from cultural centrism:  “Institu-
tions are social structures that have attained a high degree of
resilience.  Institutions are composed of cultural-cognitive, normative,
and regulative elements that, together with associated activities and
resources, provide stability and meaning to social life.”70  As the itali-
cized language indicates, the purpose of social institutions is societal
stability.  Society consists of sets of interrelated social institutions in-
cluding: family, church, school, business enterprises, corporations, po-
litical parties, and the state.  Social institutions are sets of formal
stable relations.  They are rules that define individual roles in specific
areas of society and they normally have built-in mechanisms of en-
forcement.  Collectively, they define “who we are and what we do.”71
Gore describes the importance of social institutions in the following
way:
We are born and socialized into the existing institutions,
such as family, church, school, and workplace.  These are
the basis of our identity formation and perception of self-
interests.  Our rule-following or institutionalized beha-
viour (which represents the bulk of the routine choices
we make in a day) requires a shared back-ground knowl-
edge so taken for granted that it becomes part of our col-
lective identity.  This is the cultural reinforcement of
existing institutions, which explains why even strategi-
69 For further development of this theory, see generally Michael Cody, Corporate
Governance Reform in the People’s Republic of China:  the Layered Approach to
Convergence, 3 CORP. GOV. L. R. NO. 4, 366 (2007).
70 Scott, supra note 57, at 60 (citing W. RICHARD SCOTT, INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANI- R
ZATIONS 48 (2d ed. 2001)) (emphasis added).  This view of institutions is far richer
than the view adopted by economists, and it allows cultural and social variables to
be included in analysis of market behavior in addition to profit maximizing
behavior.
71 For a discussion of sociological institutional theory, see LANCE GORE, MARKET
COMMUNISM:  THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION OF CHINA’S POST-MAO HYPER-
GROWTH 24 (1998). See generally INSTITUTIONAL PATTERNS AND ORGANIZATIONS:
CULTURE AND ENVIRONMENT (Lynne G. Zucker ed., 1988); THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL-
ISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (Paul DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell eds., 1991).
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cally oriented individuals chronically reproduce or acqui-
esce to social structures that are not in their best
interests.72
The layered approach utilizes concepts from institutional anal-
ysis in sociology.  First, the corporation is a social institution.  Second,
the institutional structure of an industrialized nation is set at the time
the country emerges into industrialization.73  Third, institutional
structures change very slowly except in the case of social crisis.  In the
context of the convergence debate, it is best to think of social institu-
tions (including the corporation) as “shock absorbers” for society.
Their role is to create stability and to insulate society from dramatic or
constant change.  In performing this function they affect the pace and
direction of change, even for corporate governance reform.  The
stronger a society’s existing social institutions, the longer it will take
for changes to occur and the more the existing institutions will absorb
the change and redirect it in a way that is complimentary to the ex-
isting institutions.  Trying to bypass or speed up the process, as is
often advocated by the economic theories, can have disastrous
results.74
According to the layered approach, convergence happens in the
following manner:
1. Economic drivers trigger corporate governance reform.75
2. Corporate governance convergence is more likely to occur
among firms that operate in the same field (i.e. global com-
panies listed on public exchanges).76
3. The speed and direction of convergence is affected by local
social institutions.77
72 See GORE, supra note 71, at 24–25.
73 See NEIL FLIGSTEIN, THE ARCHITECTURE OF MARKETS: AN ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY
OF TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY CAPITALIST SOCIETIES 36 (2001).
74 See, e.g., Bernard Black, Reiner Kraakman & Anna Tarasova, Russian Priva-
tization and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1731
(2000) (discussing the lessons learned from the “shock therapy” treatment under-
taken in Russia).
75 This element relates to the societal level of analysis and it preserves the insight
from the economic theories that economic efficiency creates pressure for corporate
governance convergence.
76 This element relates to the institutional level of analysis and it is based on the
concepts of fields and isomorphism from institutional analysis and the weak-form
convergence theory offered by Professor Coffee.
77 This element of the theory also relates to the institutional level of analysis and
it preserves the insight offered by path dependence theory and utilizes the basic
insight of institutional theory—that social institutions affect the process of
change.
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4. Government and market participants play a significant
and active role in “selecting” which foreign corporate gov-
ernance rules will be “adapted” into the local corporate gov-
ernance regime.78
The layered approach is an improvement over the previous con-
vergence theories because it is able to accommodate all of their in-
sights together with explaining how social institutions affect the
convergence process.
PART 5 – ANALYSIS OF ARRIVAL OF HOSTILE TAKEOVERS IN
JAPAN
The dramatic changes that occurred in Japanese corporate gov-
ernance over the past fifteen years are an ideal situation to test the
various corporate governance convergence theories.  Since the end of
World War II, one of the distinguishing features of the Japanese corpo-
rate governance system has been an extremely low degree of influence
exercised by shareholders.79  The absence of hostile takeover bids is
one indicium of low shareholder influence.  This low degree of influ-
ence was identified by Chalmers Johnson as one of the “improved in-
stitutional arrangements” that contributed to the “Japanese
Miracle.”80  During the 1980s, this institution was widely portrayed as
78 This element of the theory relates to the social actor level of analysis and it
includes the insights offered by the selective adaptation theories.  In short, actors
are able to make choices that direct change and there is nothing inevitable about
corporate governance convergence.
79 From an institutional perspective, the arrival of hostile takeover bids in Japan
can be studied as a “de-institutionalization” of low shareholder influence.  In the
past, institutional analysis focused on the process of how new practices became
institutionalized. See Paul Dimaggio & Walter Powell, Introduction, in Dimaggio,
THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (1991); W. RICHARD
SCOTT, INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS (1995).  Practices become institutional-
ized when they spread and persist for social reasons regardless of whether they
are economically or technically efficient.  However, recent studies in institutional
analysis have begun to focus on deinstitutionalization, or how practices are elimi-
nated across an organizational population and replaced with new practices. Id.
See generally Christine Oliver, The Antecedents of Deinstitutionalization, 13 OR-
GANIZATION STUDIES 563 (1992) (theorizing that certain political, functional and
social factors preceded deinstitutionalization and could be used as predictors of
deinstitutionalization including: changes in government regulations, declining ec-
onomic performance and changes in social values); Ahmadjian & Robinson, supra
note 67 (suggesting an alternate theory that hypothesizes economic pressures trig-
ger deinstitutionalization but social and institutional pressures shape the pace
and process of deinstitutionalization).
80 JOHNSON, supra note 42, at 12, 240 (1982).
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a competitive strength of the Japanese economic system.81  However,
it has come under severe criticism since the beginning of the Japanese
recession in 1990.  It is widely believed that the Japanese corporate
governance system is incapable of disciplining ineffective managers.
Under the weight of mounting criticism from international scholars,
market participants, and the business press, along with continued
poor economic performance, there has been a decade of remarkable
change in Japan.  Japan has moved away from the stakeholder based
corporate governance system and its low degree of shareholder influ-
ence toward the Anglo-American shareholder based corporate govern-
ance model and its high degree of shareholder influence.  This Anglo-
American model is characterized by managerial policing of activist
board members and the threat of hostile takeover bids.
This part will analyze the changes to the Japanese corporate
governance system by looking at the state of shareholder influence in
Japan at two points in time: 1990, just before the beginning of the re-
cession, and today.
A. The Japanese Corporate Governance System in 1990
1. The Stakeholder Corporate Governance System in Japan
The Japanese corporate governance system in 1990 was char-
acterized by concentrated shareholders, close bank centered corporate
networks, debt financing from group banks, internal labor markets,
and an emphasis on growth over profitability.82  This system has been
referred to as a “stakeholder” governance system because it was based
on the recognition of the interests of a number of corporate stakehold-
ers, including employees, creditors, trading partners and lastly
shareholders.83
Japan created this distinct governance system after World War
II based on the policies adopted by the occupation forces to eliminate
81 See, e.g., D. ELEANOR WESTNEY, JAPANESE ENTERPRISE FACES THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 125 (Paul DiMaggio ed., 2001). See generally MICHEL ALBERT, CAP-
ITALISM VS. CAPITALISM: HOW AMERICA’S INDIVIDUAL ACHIEVEMENT AND SHORT-
TERM PROFIT HAVE LED IT TO THE BRINK OF COLLAPSE (Paul Haviland trans.,
1993); P. Hall & D. Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism, in VARI-
ETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVAN-
TAGE 1–70 (P. Hall ed., 2001); EZRA VOGEL, JAPAN AS NUMBER ONE: LESSONS FOR
AMERICA (1979).
82 Ahmadjian & Robbins, supra note 56, at 451–52. R
83 Ahmadjian & Robbins, supra note 56, at 454; Hugh Patrick, Evolving Corporate
Governance in Japan, 8 (Ctr. on Japanese Econ. & Bus., Columbia Bus. Sch.,
Working Paper No. 220, 2004); Janis Sarra & Masafumi Nakahigashi, Balancing
Social and Corporate Culture in the Global Economy: The Evolution of Japanese
Corporate Structure and Norms, 24 LAW & POL’Y 299, 300 (2002).
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the zaibatsu.84  The occupation forces intended to set up a new compet-
itive economic system with widely diffused share ownership (and
power) so that the economic system would never again become an in-
strument for military designs.85  While the policies were successful
and eliminated the concentrated share ownership of the zaibatsu fami-
lies, the system was replaced by another form of concentrated share
ownership characterized by mochiai, or cross shareholding structures
(CSSs).86  Through these CSSs, Japanese corporations and their main
financial banks transformed the traditional Japanese business groups
by holding each other’s shares.87
The use of CSSs grew from the 1950s to the 1970s as compa-
nies sought to stabilize management, strengthen business ties with
other companies, and protect themselves from the threat of foreign
takeovers during the liberalization of the economy in the 1960s.88  The
use of CSSs expanded even further during the economic boom of the
1980s as companies purchased each other’s stock offerings.89  Esti-
mates place the level of CSSs around twenty-five percent of total
shareholdings in the 1950s, rising to forty-five percent in the 1960s,
and above fifty percent in the 1970s.90  As a result of the CSSs, share-
holders exerted little influence, and the ownership structure of Japa-
nese firms remained remarkably stable from the 1970s through to the
1990s.91
During the 1980s, the Japanese stakeholder governance sys-
tem became recognized as one of the distinctive features of the Japa-
nese economic system.92  This governance system allowed managers to
focus on long-term growth instead of short-term profit.93  It also indi-
84 Patrick, supra note 83, at 5.
85 JOHANNES HIRSCHMEIER & TSUNEHIKO YUI, THE DEVELOPMENT OF JAPANESE
BUSINESS: 1600–1973, at 230 (1975).
86 Katsumasa Suzuki, Future Prospects of Takeovers in Japan Analyzed from the
View of Share-ownership Structures and Laws in Comparison with the United
States and the European Union, 42 COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT’L L. 777, 814 (2004).
87 Id. at 777.
88 Hideaki Inoue, Companies Continue to Unwind Cross-Shareholdings: The Fis-
cal 1999 Cross-Shareholding Survey, NLI Research Institute, No. 145, at 11, 15
(2000), available at http://www.nli-research.co.jp/english/economics/2000/eco
0010a.pdf; Suzuki, supra note 86, at 815.
89 Id. at 15.
90 Hideaki Miyajima & Kuroki Fumiaki, The Unwinding of Cross-Shareholding:
Causes, Effects and Implications in, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN: INSTITU-
TIONAL CHANGE AND ORGANIZATIONAL DIVERSITY 79, 84–85 (Masahiko Aoki et al.
ed., 2007).
91 Id. at 85.
92 Patrick, supra note 83, at 9 (discussing the self-confidence in the system, which
was reinforced in the 1980s).
93 Ahmadjian & Robbins, supra note 56, at 455.
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rectly supported several other unique Japanese institutions, including
the long-term employment structure and the seniority–based wage
practice.94 Some scholars even advocate that the stakeholder model
should be adopted by the United States.95
To see the distinctive character of the Japanese governance
system in 1990, on the eve of the recession, one need only read the
words of Kanji Ishizumi describing the prevailing social feelings con-
cerning companies and their stakeholders:
Undoubtedly, the majority within Japan would say with-
out hesitation that [companies] exist ordinarily for the
benefit of their employees. Correspondingly, employers
and senior business executives are under an obligation to
exert their best business efforts to assure the financial
stability of their employees, and in turn, their depen-
dents.  A Japanese company can be compared to a ship,
with the employer and senior executives as its captains
and chief officers, and the employees as its crew – a com-
munity bound together by a common destiny.  For any
employee, the corporation for which he works is as im-
portant as his own private life, because once he has
joined the company he will (under the lifetime employ-
ment practice presently prevailing in Japan) spend at
least 35-40 years there, probably until he reaches retire-
ment age.  As an employee of the company, he exper-
iences the joys and sorrows of life – through human
relationships, successes and failures, and promotions
and demotions – just as he does at home in his private
life.  For many Japanese, companies are much more than
just the place of work where they are forced to contribute
their labor in exchange for a salary and fringe benefits.
Therefore attempts by the owner of the company, whether
its founder or chief executive officer, to sell the controlling
interest to an outsider are seen as betrayal, analogous to
that of a captain of a ship deserting his crew in a storm.96
The low degree of influence exercised by shareholders characterized
the unique Japanese stakeholder governance system.97 As late as
1990, shareholders in Japan exercised none of the activist rights that
94 See JOHNSON, supra note 42, at 12.  It should be noted that these two institu-
tions are also in the process of being de-institutionalized in Japan. See, e.g., Pat-
rick, supra note 83, at 23.
95 See, e.g., ALBERT, supra note 81, at 75.
96 KANJI ISHIZUMI, ACQUIRING JAPANESE COMPANIES: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
IN THE JAPANESE MARKET 12 (1990) (emphasis added).
97 Patrick, supra note 83, at 7.
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North American investors would be accustomed to, including: electing
shareholder representatives to boards of directors, combating proxy
fights for control of corporations, or encouraging shareholder max-
imization transactions in the form of takeover bids or mergers and ac-
quisitions activity.98
2. Measurements of Shareholder Influence
There are a number of ways to measure shareholder influence.
In a 2005 study, Ahmadjian and Robbins measured shareholder influ-
ence indirectly by examining the relationship between foreign owner-
ship of shares in Japan and corporate restructurings through
downsizing or asset divestitures—behaviors more consistent with the
shareholder governance system than the stakeholder governance sys-
tem.99  They found that companies with higher percentages of foreign
ownership were more likely to engage in downsizing or asset divesti-
ture.100  However, they also made a resource dependence101 argument
that the influence of foreigners “depended on the degree to which a
firm was embedded in the Japanese system through its ties to finan-
cial institutions or business groups.”102
Given more recent events in Japan, including increasing exam-
ples of direct pressure being exerted through shareholder activism, it
may be more appropriate to start measuring shareholder influence in
Japan using direct shareholder activism variables.  This article mea-
sures shareholder influence using two direct shareholder activism
variables:  (1) the existence of shareholder representatives on the
board of directors, measured by whether a company has adopted the
new U.S. style corporate structure, and (2) the existence of a market
for corporate control, measured by the prevalence of hostile takeover
bids or proxy contests.103  The market for corporate control will be fur-
98 Id. at 20.
99 Ahmadjian & Robbins, supra note 56, at 451–52. R
100 Id. at 466.
101 See generally W. RICHARD SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATURAL AND
OPEN SYSTEM  (5th ed. 2003).  Resource dependency is an organizational theory.
This theory emphasizes organizational adaptation.  It assumes that organizations
and their leaders can act to improve chances of survival of the organization if it
can reduce its dependency on its environment.  The need for the organization to
acquire resources (capital, labor, supplies, etc.) makes it dependent on its environ-
ment.  The scarcity of the resources determines the dependency of the
organization.
102 Ahmadjian & Robbins, supra note 56, at 467. R
103 Other possible measurements for shareholder influence are: (1) number of de-
rivative actions (suits brought by shareholders on behalf of the corporation) and,
(2) the number of shareholder proposals put forward at the annual meeting–
which is a complicated measure to use in Japan because of the existence of
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ther analyzed by tracking the dissolution of the traditional CSSs that
characterized the stakeholder governance system in Japan and the
corresponding increase in foreign ownership of securities.  In 1989, on
the eve of the Japanese Recession, the measure of these shareholder
influence variables was zero.104
a. The Composition of Japanese Boards of Directors in 1990
In 1990, there were no shareholder representatives on boards
of directors in Japan. Boards of directors in Japan were exclusively
composed of former employees.105  This can be explained by the domi-
nance of the Japanese version of the stakeholder governance system
with its emphasis on the importance of the interests of employees.106
b. The Absence of a Market for Corporate Control in 1990
In 1990, there was no market for corporate control in Japan.
Hostile takeover bids simply did not occur.  In fact, only one hostile
takeover bid had been attempted in Japan in the 1980s.  In 1985, two
foreign firms, Trafalgar Holdings (United States) and Glen Interna-
tional (United Kingdom) made a bid for Minebea Company. The bid
was unsuccessful, and hostile bids did not return to Japan until
1999.107  The cultural explanations offered for the absence of hostile
takeover bids are no longer persuasive because of their recent arrival
in Japan.108  Similarly, legal scholars have concluded that there were
no legal barriers to a market for corporate control.109  Most commenta-
tors believe that the explanation for the absence of the market for cor-
porate control in Japan was explained largely by the existence of the
CSSs.110
There are two significant measures for CSSs.  First, is the mea-
sure of stable shareholder holdings (antei kabunushi)—all shares held
by “long-term shareholders” including commercial banks, insurance
Sokaiya. See CURTIS MILHAUPT & MARK WEST, ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS AND
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN: THE IMPACT OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL RULES
9–35 (2004) (discussing derivative actions and Sokaiya in Japan).
104 The data for both of these variables for the years 1989 to 2004 are contained in
Table 1.
105 See WESTNEY, supra note 81, at 124; Sarra & Nakahigashi, supra note 83, at
339.
106 WESTNEY, supra note 81, at 124.
107 Dai Higashino, Corporate Restructuring Picks up Steam (Part 2):  New Cur-
rents and Prospects, 9 JAPAN ECONOMIC MONTHLY, 3 (2004).
108 See generally ISHIZUMI, supra note 96 (characterizing cultural explanation).
109 See Suzuki, supra note 86.
110 See id.; see also Miyajima & Fumiaki, supra note 90.
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companies, and other firms.111  For the purposes of this paper this
broader concept will be referred to as CSSs.  The second measure is the
narrower measure of shares held by “friendly” financial institutions or
firms in reciprocal cross shareholding relationships (“RCSs”).112  In
1989, on the eve of the Japanese Recession, CSSs were 44.9%113 and
foreign shareholdings were 3.9%.114
3. The Shareholder Corporate Governance System in Anglo
American Jurisdictions
The Japanese stakeholder governance system should be con-
trasted to the shareholder corporate governance system dominant in
Anglo-American countries, particularly in the United States.  In dra-
matic contrast to the Japanese stakeholder governance system, the
shareholder governance system is characterized by dispersed share
ownership, strong anti-trust tendencies, equity financing, external la-
bor markets, and an emphasis on profitability over growth.115  In An-
glo-American countries, shareholders have a significant amount of
influence, and they actively exercise it by electing representatives to
boards, fighting proxy contests, and supporting shareholder maximiza-
tion processes, such as takeover bids.  Comparatively, in the United
States in 1989, boards often contained one or more shareholder repre-
sentatives or outside directors and hostile takeover bids were common-
place.  In fact, 1989 saw the closing of a decade of frantic takeover
activity in the United States where one-third of the Fortune 500 com-
panies had been subject to a takeover bid during the decade, a major-
ity of those bids being hostile.116
4. The Contrasting Feature between the Two Governance Systems:
The Separation of Ownership from Control
In 1932, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means identified the separa-
tion of ownership from control as the major problem that resulted from
111 Fumio Kuroki, The Relationship of Companies and Banks as Cross-Sharehold-
ings Unwind–Fiscal 2002 Cross Shareholding Survey, N.L.I. INSTITUTE (2003),
available at http://www.nli-research.co.jp/english/economics/2003/eco031118.pdf.
112 Id. at 3–4 (describing cross-shareholding relationships and long-term share-
holding relationships).
113 Id. at 6.
114 Stock Exchange, 2008 Shareownership Survey, 10 (2008), http://www.tse.or.jp/
english/market/data/shareownership/english2008.pdf.
115 Ahmadjian & Robbins, supra note 56, at 451–52.
116 Gerald Davis and Suzanne Stout, Organization Theory and the Market for Cor-
porate Control: A Dynamic Analysis of the Characteristics of Large Takeover
Targets, 1980–1990, 37 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 605, 605 (1992).
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the development of capitalism.117  For the first time in history, the
owners of a corporation (the shareholders) were no longer the manag-
ers of the corporation.118  Through the evolution of the joint stock com-
pany, with diffuse stock ownership, the control of the owners had been
handed over to professional managers.119  This was a serious struc-
tural problem in the system.  Managers were no longer accountable to
a stakeholder group that could effectively discipline them for poor per-
formance.  The United States shareholder governance system came to
prominence in the last half of the twentieth century in large part to
address the deficiency in stakeholder oversight.  In the shareholder
governance system, managers are obligated to act primarily in the best
interests of shareholders, as opposed to other stakeholders.  If they do
not, they face the possibility of having activist shareholders on their
boards, proxy battles, or hostile takeover bids being launched to gain
control of their companies.  In theory, the threat of such actions keeps
managers honest.120
Publicly traded companies in Japan, on the other hand, repre-
sented one of the most extreme adherences to the separation of owner-
ship from control in publicly traded companies.121  Managers
controlled Japanese firms and shareholders had almost no influence.
Therefore, according to the theory, it was natural, as the recession con-
tinued throughout the 1990s, for there to be pressure to change the
stakeholder governance system to make corporate managers in Japan
more accountable and to force managers to make the tough decisions
to return Japanese companies to their growth trajectories.122
PART 6 – THE JAPANESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SYSTEM
IN 2006
A. The Increase in Shareholder Influence
Over the last decade, the Japanese corporate governance sys-
tem has undergone a remarkable period of change.  The degree of
117 See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPO-
RATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (William S. Hein & Company 1982) (1932).
118 Id.
119 See Carlo Osi, Board Reforms With a Japanese Twist: Viewing the Japanese
Board of Directors With a Delaware Lens, 3 BROOK J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 325,
341–42 (2009).
120 The effectiveness of the shareholder governance system for addressing the is-
sue of separation of ownership from control is ambiguous at best, but it is outside
the scope of this paper.
121 Patrick, supra note 83, at 7.  It is a curious historical fact that the occupation
forces in Japan, by carrying out their policies of disbanding the zaibatsu, created
the very problem they were trying to avoid at home.
122 See Jacoby, supra note 33, at 14–15.
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change is best illustrated by examining the two measures of share-
holder activism as they exist now.
B. The Composition of Boards of Directors in 2006123
Japanese boards of directors are no longer composed exclu-
sively of employees.  Boards now increasingly include outside directors
or shareholder representatives.  In 2001, amendments to the Japanese
Commercial Code introduced the concept of an “outside director”124
and, in 2002, additional amendments gave Japanese corporations the
option of adopting an Anglo-American “corporation with committees”
structure.125  This structure eliminates the traditional corporate audi-
tor and replaces the internal auditing function with a board of direc-
tors composed of independent board members who sit on committees
(including an audit committee).126
Changes in corporate board composition speak to the drastic
shift in how corporate boards and corporations are viewed in Japan.  It
is estimated that between  thirty-six and sixty companies adopted the
new corporate structure at their earliest opportunity in 2003127 and
that another 10 companies had boards of directors that had at least as
many outside directors as inside directors.128  The estimates on the
number of companies adopting the new structure rose to 60 in 2004
and 125 in 2005.129  This data is summarized in Table 1.  These num-
bers are small considering that the number of listed companies in Ja-
pan is 2500.130  However, their significance cannot be understated
because of the dramatic shift in beliefs that they represent.
C. The Market for Corporate Control in 2006
Hostile takeover bids have also arrived in Japan.  However,
they are still isolated instances that have been precipitated by a small
123 For the purposes of this paper, it is assumed that any company which adopted
the new corporate structure has either outside directors or shareholder
representatives on its board, and therefore the measure adequately measures
shareholder influence.
124 Mark Poe, Kay Shimizu & Jeannie Simpson, Revising the Japanese Commer-
cial Code: A Summary and Evaluation of the Reform Effort, 2 STAN. J. E. ASIAN
AFF. 71, 72–73 (Spring 2002).
125 Hiroyuki Itami, Revision of the Commercial Code and Reform of the Japanese
Corporate Governance, 2 JAPAN LAB. REV. 4 (2005), available at http://www.jil.go.
jp/english/JLR/documents/2005/JLR05_itami.pdf.
126 Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Choice as Regulatory Reform: The Case
of Japanese Corporate Governance, 53 AM. J. COMP. L.  342, 352–53 (2005).
127 Itami, supra note 125, at 9.
128 Patrick, supra note 83, at 25.
129 Itami, supra note 125, at 4, 11; Patrick, supra note 83, at 25.
130 Patrick, supra note 83, at 25.
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group of market actors.  Hostile takeovers have not yet been accepted
as a legitimate business practice by the larger Japanese business com-
munity.  In fact, the larger business community seems more interested
in defensive measures than the actual bids themselves.
Since 1999, there have been fifteen hostile takeover bids or
proxy battles attempted.  The data on these bids is presented by year
in Table 1, and each of the bids is summarized in the Appendix.  The
Hills Tribe has figured prominently in most of the bids.  All of the ear-
lier bids were made by Murakami’s M&A Consulting group or foreign
firms and were not considered to be an indication of a general shift in
Japanese business culture.  However, some of the latest bids, includ-
ing the Yushemin Holdings bid for JEC, the Oiji Paper bid for
Hokuetsu Paper Mills and the Aoki Holdings bid for Futata Co. involve
only Japanese market participants.131  These latest bids may be wa-
tershed events that signal a change in Japanese business culture that
hostile takeover bids may become an acceptable business strategy in
Japan.  All of this evidence suggests that the institution of low share-
holder activism may have begun to de-institutionalize over the period
between 2000 and 2006.
PART 7 – CONVERGENCE OR SELECTIVE ADAPTATION?
In this section, the changes to the Japanese corporate govern-
ance system will be used to evaluate the traditional convergence theo-
ries and the alternate theory of selective adaptation.  The aim of the
analysis is to determine which theory is better at explaining what ac-
tually occurred in Japan.
A. Japanese Hostile Takeovers and Convergence Theories
The analysis outlined above shows clear evidence against the
corporate convergence theories based on economic efficiency argu-
ments.  First, from a societal level, the governance reforms have taken
place over a very long period of time (over a decade) even though Japa-
nese firms performed poorly on an economic basis throughout much of
the 1990s.  Economic efficiency arguments would have predicted the
changes to happen much more quickly to return firms to profitability.
The deinstitutionalization of low shareholder influence and the arrival
of hostile takeover bids should have started when the recession hit in
1990, or shortly thereafter.
Second, the convergence theories would have predicted that the
Japanese corporate governance system and Japanese form of hostile
131 As mentioned in the introduction, it has since come to light that Murakami
and Lehman Brothers were also involved in the early planning stages of this bid.
See discussion supra INTRODUCTION.
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takeover bid would have adopted the same form that these institutions
have in the United States because that form is the most efficient.
However, that does not appear to have happened.  From an institu-
tional perspective, the Japanese corporate governance system is not
based on the Anglo-American model, but instead it is a conscious blend
of Japanese, American and other characteristics.  The economic effi-
ciency argument postulates that all governance systems will look the
same.  The findings in this study on the adaptation of the governance
systems into something uniquely Japanese contradicts this prediction.
This process of adaptation is discussed below.
B. Japanese Hostile Takeovers and Selective Adaptation Theories
The selective adaptation theories are better at explaining the
arrival of hostile takeover bids in Japan than the convergence theories
because they take into account the role that individual actors can play.
However, the theories do not fully take into account the affect that
Japanese social institutions had on the convergence process and they
discount the triggering effects predicted by the economic theories.132
C. The Layered Approach
The layered approach is the best approach for explaining the
arrival of hostile takeover bids in Japan because it accommodates the
insights from the economic theories and the selective adaptation theo-
ries together with taking into account the complexity and strength of
the Japanese social institutions.  The four stages of the layered ap-
proach are explored in more detail below.133
1. Economic Drivers Trigger Corporate Governance Reform
Economic pressures in Japan triggered the changes to the cor-
porate governance system by dissolving the CSSs and causing a corre-
132 Milhaupt’s theory of selective adaptation does not take into account social in-
stitutions borrowing from foreign sources or the role of administrative guidance.
See generally Milhaupt, supra note 4.  Potter’s theory of selective adaptation is
able to accommodate the existence of these institutions within the concept of com-
plimentarily – the extent to which the foreign institutions are consistent with local
institutions.  Although, Potter’s theory is not able to examine the effects of the
institutions directly. See sources cited supra note 58.
133 Because of space constraints, the author was not able to include a full empiri-
cal analysis of the significance of the relationships hypothesized in this section.
However, there have been a number of studies that have done so – and to the
extent that those studies support the hypotheses presented, their findings will be
presented.  Where no study exists, potential measures for the relationships are
proposed.
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sponding increase in foreign ownership by Anglo-American
investors.134
a. The Dissolution of the Cross-Shareholdings
Table 2 provides a summary of the CSSs and RCSs for the
years 1989–2003.135  By 2003, CSSs in Japan had declined to 24%
from a peak of 45.2% in 1992.  The causes of this decline were three
economic pressures: the recession; changes to general accounting rules
to value securities at market; and changes to banking regulations re-
lated to the minimum capital requirements for banks.136
b. The Recession
The recession in Japan started in 1990.  Poor economic per-
formance of the Japanese economy was the basic trigger for the corpo-
rate governance reforms.  If there had been no recession there would
not have been any need for change.  The relationship between the re-
cession and the deinstitutionalization of low shareholder influence can
be tested by linking firm economic performance and the dissolution of
the CSSs:
Hypothesis 1:  Firms with poor ROE will be more likely to re-
duce CSSs.
Hypothesis 2: Firms with poor sales growth will be more likely
to reduce CSSs.
Studies indicate that at these hypotheses are true.  For example, the
NLI Institute’s 1997 Cross Shareholding Study found: (1) that firms
that were underperforming the market in sales growth were more
likely to unwind CSSs; and (2) firms that had an ROE below the mar-
ket average were more likely to unwind CSSs.137
c. Accounting Changes
Under Japanese generally accepted accounting principles, in-
vestments in market securities could be carried at cost.  This meant
that underperforming investments in CSSs could be carried indefi-
134 This part of the theory argues that the insight of the convergence theories re-
lating to economic pressures are pressures only and that they do not explain much
about the actual process of change. See Cody, supra note 34, at 366.
135 Data collection on this variable ceased in 2003.
136 Suzuki, supra note 86, at 816–20.
137 Hideaki Inoue, Recent Developments in Cross-Shareholding, NLI RES. INST.,
No. 121, at 14, 20–21 (1998), available at http://www.nli-research.co.jp/english/eco-
nomics/1998/eco9812b.pdf.
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nitely on balance sheets, regardless of their market value, with no fi-
nancial penalty to the firm.  However, an important change was made
to accounting practices in 2001.  It provided that for all fiscal years
starting April 1, 2001, shares held, other than those held for trading
purposes, had to be reported at fair value and the unrealized gains or
losses reported as a component of shareholder’s equity.  The impact of
this change in Japan was huge because CSSs fell into this category
and, as a result of the recession, the market value of most CSSs was
below their cost.  Furthermore, for the fiscal year starting April 1,
2003, shares which values had declined more than 50% from acquisi-
tion cost had the impairment charge run through the income state-
ment.138  As such, Japanese firms and financial institutions were
finally required to re-evaluate their CSSs because any CSS they chose
to maintain could affect the firm’s financial performance.  Since there
is evidence that many companies already adopted the mark-to-market
approach in 2000 in anticipation of the adoption of the rule in April
2001,139 this relationship can be tested in the following way:
Hypothesis 3: The dissolution of CSSs rises significantly in
2000 and 2001 before the accounting change comes into effect
on April 1, 2001.
This hypothesis seems to be supported by the data presented in Table
1.  CSSs stayed relatively stable from 1989 (44.9%) to 1998 (39.9%).
Then there was a drastic reduction in the CSSs two years prior to the
implementation of the accounting change, with CSSs dropping to
37.9% in 1999 and 33.0% in 2000.
Also, since CSSs are valued at market after 2000, the dissolu-
tion of the CSSs should increase in years when the market value of
securities decreases.  This could be tested in the following way:
Hypothesis 4: The dissolution of CSSs increases when the Nik-
kei average declines.
This hypothesis seems to be supported by a cursory glance at the Nik-
kei average.  The Nikkei average is outlined in Table 3.  The Nikkei
average hit a ten-year low in 2001, and then continued to hit new lows
through to 2003.  The year’s 2001 to 2003 are also the years in which
CSSs declined the most.
138 Suzuki, supra note 86, at 817.
139 Fumiaki Kuroki, The Present Status of Unwinding of Cross Shareholding: The
Fiscal 2000 Survey of Cross Shareholding, 157 NLI RES. INST. FIN. 24, 27 (2001),
available at http://www.nli-research.co.jp/english/economics/2001/eco0110b.pdf.
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d. Changes to Banking Regulations
The accounting changes discussed above had the most impact
on the banks because they are subject to minimum capital standard
requirements under both the Basel Capital Accord of the Bank for In-
ternational Settlement and under Japanese banking regulations.
Under the Basel Capital Accord, the target standard of capital to
weighted risk assets that international banks are generally expected
to achieve is set at 8%.140  The result of these capital requirement
rules for Japanese banks are that any profits from a rise in the market
price of CSSs will not improve the capital ratio of the banks, but any
losses from the fall in the market price of CSSs will decrease the
bank’s capital ratio.141  As such, there was increased incentive for the
banks to sell their CSS positions:
Hypothesis 5: Reduction of CSSs should be higher for banks
and financial institutions than for corporations.
This hypothesis is supported by Miyajima’s 2005 study that found that
the rate of selling of CSS shares by banks was similar to the rate of
selling by corporations until 2000 and then the rate of selling by banks
significantly outpaced the rate of selling by corporations by about
2.5:1.142
2. Corporate Governance Convergence is More Likely to Occur
Among Firms That Operate in the Same Field
In the case of Japan, this part of the theory relates to firms
that have significant foreign shareholders.  The inclusion of foreign
shareholders in a firm’s capital structure expands that firm’s “field” to
include other firms in which those shareholders have investments.
This increases the pressure on those firms to adopt practices consis-
tent with the firms in this now larger field (isomorphism) which now
includes foreign firms.  Table 2 provides a summary of foreign owner-
ship of securities in Japan for the years 1989–2005.  It shows that for-
eign investors were the primary purchasers of the shares of the
dissolving CSSs.  Foreign shareholdings increased from 3.9% in 1989
to 24.1% in 2005.143  The evidence also points to an acceleration in the
pace of foreign holding acquisitions.  In 2006, foreign shareholders be-
140 See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, BASEL II: INTERNATIONAL CONVER-
GENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENTS AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAME-
WORK ¶ 5 (June 2004), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.htm.
141 Suzuki, supra note 86, at 818.
142 Miyajima & Fumiaki, supra note 90, at 90.
143 TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE, 2008 SHAREOWNERSHIP SURVEY 10, http://www.tse.or.
jp/english/market/data/shareownership/english2008.pdf.
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came the largest single group of owners of Japanese shares for the first
time in history.  Foreign ownership of shares in 2006 (at 25.4%) was
larger than the ownership by financial institutions (at 24.6%) and bus-
iness corporations (at 23.6%).144
While no data is available to determine the nationality of the
foreign investors, a recent study indicated that most of the foreign in-
stitutional investors in Japan were from Anglo-American economies,
and predominantly from the United States and the United
Kingdom.145
As stated previously, Ahmadjian and Robbins found that firms
with a higher percentage of foreign investors were more likely to adopt
practices consistent with Anglo-American investor capitalism.146  Con-
sistent with this finding, the following hypotheses can be made:
Hypothesis 6: The greater the percentage of a firm’s shares
held by foreign investors the more likely the company is to
adopt the new corporate structure.
Hypothesis 7: The greater percentage of a firm’s shares held by
foreign investors the more likely it is to be subject to a hostile
takeover bid or proxy battle.
Unfortunately, there is not enough data yet to conduct the analysis for
either of these hypotheses.
Also, since companies with foreign ownership are probably al-
ready outside of the CSS structure:
Hypothesis 8: The greater the percentage of a firm’s shares
held by foreign investors the more likely the firm is to reduce
CSSs.
Research shows that this last hypothesis is true.  Miyajima Hideaki
and Kuroki Fumiaki found that firms with high levels of foreign own-
ership tended to unwind cross-shareholding patterns.147
Therefore, based on the data presented in this paper, a prelimi-
nary conclusion can be drawn that the deinstitutionalization of low
shareholder influence was triggered by the economic pressures of the
recession, changes in accounting practices and changes to banking reg-
ulations.  These pressures resulted in the dissolution of the traditional
CSSs and a corresponding increase in foreign ownership of shares.
144 TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE, 2008 SHAREOWNERSHIP SURVEY 10, http://www.tse.or.
jp/english/market/data/shareownership/english2008.pdf.
145 Ahmadjian & Robbins, supra note 56, at 456. R
146 Id. at 467.
147 Miyajima & Fumiaki, supra note 90, at 116–17.
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Unfortunately, there is not enough data yet to support the final por-
tion of the proposed chain of events:  that foreign ownership led to in-
creased shareholder influence.
3. The Speed and Direction of Convergence is Affected by Local
Social Institutions
The pace and direction of corporate governance convergence in
Japan has been affected by at least three social and institutional fac-
tors:  the strength of the existing Japanese institutions; the Japanese
institutions of borrowing from foreign sources; and administrative
guidance.148
a. The Pace of Change
The pace of change in the Japanese governance system has
been slow.  The economic triggers for convergence started in 1990 with
the onset of the recession, and significant progress on convergence was
not visible until 2000.  This has led some scholars, including Curtis
Milhaupt, to talk about “the lost decade in Japan” of missed opportu-
nity for reform.149  However, this fact is best explained by the theory
that social and institutional structures set the pace of convergence.
Given the strength and homogeneity of the existing governance insti-
tutions in Japan, it is not surprising that it took a long time for these
institutions to deinstitutionalize.  This theory can be tested by mea-
suring the dissolution of CSSs among corporate groups (with stronger
institutional ties) when compared to the dissolution of CSS between
corporate groups:
Hypothesis 9:  CSSs declined less among corporate groups than
between corporate groups.
The NLI Institute’s 2000 Cross Shareholdings Survey supports this
finding.  The study found that CSSs dissolved more rapidly between
corporate groups than they did among corporate groups.150
148 These are the non-economic institutions that Milhaupt’s selective adaptation
theory is not able to take into account. See Milhaupt, supra note 4.
149 See MITSUHIRO FUKAO, JAPAN’S LOST DECADE AND WEAKNESS IN ITS CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE, in JAPAN’S ECONOMIC RECOVERY: COMMERCIAL POLICY,
MONETARY POLICY, AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 289–327 (Edward Elgar ed.,
2003); Curtis J. Milhaupt, A Lost Decade for Japanese Corporate Governance Re-
form?  What’s Changed, What Hasn’t, and Why (Columbia Law Sch., The Ctr. for
Law and Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 234, 2003), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID442960_code030930630.pdf?abstractid=442
960.
150 Kuroki, supra note 111, at 7–12.
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b. The Process of Change
It is important to note that Japanese institutions are playing a
significant role in directing changes to the governance system.  Two
unique Japanese institutions in particular are significantly influenc-
ing these changes: the institution of borrowing from foreign sources;
and the institution of administrative guidance.
c. Borrowing from Foreign Sources
Some argue the increase in foreign ownership of Japanese se-
curities has caused Japanese managers to accept the “American way of
thinking”, that the management of corporations is for shareholders.151
However, to assume such a causal relationship would be a mistake.  In
the area of law in general and particularly corporate governance, the
Japanese have a long history of borrowing from foreign sources to
drive progress in domestic institutions.  The first evidence of this can
be seen during the early years of the Meiji Restoration (1868–1895)
when there was a real enthusiasm for Western things.  This enthusi-
asm even had its own phrase: bummei kaika which means “civilization
and enlightenment.”152  During the Meiji Restoration, many scholars
examined Western social and political institutions as possible replace-
ments for the outdated institutions of the Tokugawa Period.  Some of
those Western institutions were adopted, for example: joint stock com-
panies, a national banking system and the Japanese Commercial Code
of 1899 (which was based on the German Code).153  During the twenti-
eth century, this practice became institutionalized as Japan looked to
the West for inspiration in developing its domestic institutions each
time its economy stagnated.  This has occurred at least three more
times in the last century and a half: the post WWII era, the 1960’s
liberalization of the economy, and finally in the late 1990’s through to
the present day.154
What is important to note about this institution is that the
Japanese do not fully adopt foreign institutions.  Instead, they have a
long history of adapting those institutions to blend in with their do-
mestic institutions, to generate something that is uniquely Japanese.
Hirschmeier and Yui, in the introduction to their history of Japanese
business organizations, describe the institution of borrowing from for-
eign sources, in the following way, “Japan took over the forms, but, as
we will see, very little of the spirit of capitalism.  The fact that Japan
151 Suzuki, supra note 86, at 820; see Itami, supra note 125, at 5; Sarra & Nakahi-
gashi, supra note 83, at 300.
152 Japanese 1-2-3.com, http://www.japanese123.com/bunmeikaika.htm.
153 See HIRSCHMEIER & YUI, supra note 85, at 129. R
154 Tom Ginsburg has compared the latest round of reforms to the reforms of the
Meiji era in his article. See Ginsburg, supra note 59.
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could adopt Western style technology and organizational forms, and
yet penetrate them with her own non-Western ‘spirit,’ is certainly
significant.”155
An example of this institution at work in the current context is
how the Japanese adopted hostile takeover bids.  Even though Japa-
nese market participants have started to engage in hostile takeover
bids, not one of the bids has been successful.  The participants, so far,
have always found a way to resolve the situation in a distinctly Japa-
nese way by coming to a friendly long-term agreement backed by mu-
tual cross-shareholdings.  In describing the cultural changes that are
happening in Japan, it would not be accurate to conclude that Japa-
nese managers have realized the superiority of the Anglo-American
system and finally chosen to adopt it.  Instead, it would be more accu-
rate to describe the process as the most recent example in a repeating
pattern of Japanese actors borrowing and adapting Western institu-
tions with domestic institutions.  The adaptation process will be dis-
cussed more below.
d. Administrative Guidance
Chalmers Johnson identified the industrial policy of Japanese
government and in particular the policies of the Ministry of Interna-
tional Trade and Industry (MITI), as the primary cause of the “Japa-
nese Miracle.”156  In particular, Johnson emphasized the importance
of the institution of “administrative guidance” to Japan’s economic suc-
cess during the 1970s and 1980s.157  Administrative guidance was a
tool utilized by MITI to ensure that its policies were adopted and used
by markets participants during the 1960s.158  Johnson described ad-
ministrative guidance in the following way:
[A] Japanese analyst writes, administrative guidance “is
what makes Japan’s business tick.  It is what made this
country the world’s third industrial nation.  It is one of
the pillars that support Japan Incorporated.”  There is
nothing mysterious about administrative guidance.  It
refers to the authority of the government, contained in
the laws establishing the various ministries, to issue di-
rectives (shiji), requests (yoboˆ), warnings (keikoku), sug-
gestions (kankoku), and encouragements (kanshoˆ) to the
enterprises or clients within a particular ministry’s juris-
diction.  Administrative guidance is constrained only by
the requirement that the “guides” must come under a
155 HIRSCHMEIER & YUI, supra note 85, at 7.
156 JOHNSON, supra note 42, at 74.
157 Id. at 265–66.
158 Id.
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given governmental organ’s jurisdiction, and although it
is not based on any explicit law, it cannot violate the
law. . . .159
One of the primary tools for the issuance of administrative guidance in
Japan is the issuing of policy statements:
In some of its forms administrative guidance is indistin-
guishable from a formal legal order by the government.
An example is guidance through policy statements (shidoˆ
yoˆkoˆ).  This refers to the obligation of the public to pay
attention and respond in good faith to properly drawn
and published policies of the government, although pen-
alties for non-compliance have never been specified.160
Japanese market actors follow administrative guidance from govern-
ment agencies even though they are not legally obligated to do so.
The administrative guidance of MITI (now METI), exercised
through its ability to issue policy statements, is an example of how
social and institutional factors can direct the convergence process.
Since the beginning of the current recession, METI has continued its
role as an active maker of industrial policy for the economy.  It has
done so in much the same away as it did during the 1970s and 1980s.
One commentator has stated that throughout this latest period,
“[c]hange has been driven significantly by government bureaucrat-led
reforms of corporate and related laws and institutions.”161  For exam-
ple, during this period METI has been very active revising laws,
changing the tax system, using financial stimulus to try and kick-start
the economy and issuing policy statements to guide market partici-
pants.  METI amended the Japanese Commercial Code in 1997, 1999,
2000 and 2002 to, among other things, introduce holdings companies,
introduce the option to adopt the new United States style committee
system of corporate governance, to allow stock options, and to allow for
mergers to happen by way of share exchanges.  Also, a new consoli-
dated Corporate Law was enacted on June 26, 2005 that came into
force in 2006.162
One example, in particular, illustrates the administrative gui-
dance role still played by METI: its new policy statement on takeover
bid defense measures.  As the CSSs dissolved, Japanese companies be-
159 Id.
160 Id. at 266.
161 Patrick, supra note 83, at 13.
162 The most interesting provision in the Corporate Law is the one that will allow
foreign investors to make bids for Japanese companies by way of share exchange
although the implementation of this provision has been delayed until May 1, 2007.
For a complete list of changes to the Commercial Code and other relevant Japa-
nese Legislation, see Higashino, supra note 107, at 3.
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came vulnerable to hostile takeover bids.  As a result, they needed to
adopt new defensive measures to replace the stabilizing influence pro-
vided by the traditional CSSs.163  Japanese companies never before
had to resort to takeover bid defense measures because there had been
no hostile takeovers in Japan. There was real uncertainty about
whether such measures were legal.164  As a result, market partici-
pants were reluctant to adopt defensive measures for fear that these
measures would cause declines in stock prices or would be illegal.165
Some market participants looked to the courts for a solution.166  But,
most looked to METI to provide a framework within which they could
operate, even though METI does not have the formal legal authority to
provide guidelines on this matter.167  As an illustration of the impor-
163 MINISTRY OF ECONOMY, TRADE AND INDUSTRY, & MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, GUIDE-
LINES REGARDING TAKEOVER DEFENSE FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROTECTION AND EN-
HANCEMENT OF CORPORATE VALUE AND SHAREHOLDERS’ COMMON INTERESTS 2–3,
(May 27, 2005), trans. version available at http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/economy/
keiei_innovation/keizaihousei/pdf/shishin_hontai.pdf.
164 See Suzuki, supra note 86, at 799–807. See generally Ronald Gilson, The
Poison Pill in Japan: The Missing Infrastructure, (Columbia Univ. Law Sch. Ctr.
for Law & Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 244, 2006), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=509522.
165 METI: CORPORATE VALUE STUDY GROUP, SUMMARY OUTLINE OF DISCUSSION
POINTS: PROPOSAL TOWARD ESTABLISHMENT OF RULES FOR A FAIR BUSINESS COM-
MUNITY 5 (Mar. 2005), available at http://www.meti.go.jp/english/information/
downloadfiles/Corporate%20Value.pdf.
166 For example, both Livedoor and SFP Value Realization Master Fund Ltd. went
to court to obtain rulings on the legality of defensive measures. See Livedoor v.
Nippon Broadcasting, Mar. 11 (Tokyo District Court) 1726 Commercial L. Rev. 47;
Livedoor v. Nippon Broadcasting, Mar. 16, 2005 (Tokyo District Court) 1726 Com-
mercial L. Rev. 59, and Livedoor v. Nippon Broadcasting, Mar. 23, 2005 (Tokyo
High Court) 1728 Commercial L. Rev. 41; See also SFP Value Realization Master
Fund v. Nireco Corporation, June 1, 2005 (Tokyo District Court) 1734 Commercial
L. Rev. 37; SFP Value Realization Master Fund v. Nireco Corporation, June 9,
2005 (Tokyo District Court) 1735 Commercial L. Rev. 44 and SFP Value Realiza-
tion Master Fund v. Nireco Corporation, June 15, 2005 (Tokyo High Court) 1735
Commercial L. Rev. 48.
167 This point was recognized by Milhaupt.  However, he seems to have misunder-
stood the practice of administrative guidance because he argues that METI was
not the appropriate body to rule on this.  He would have preferred the Securities
Exchange Surveillance Commission to provide these guidelines (as is done by the
Securities and Exchange Commission in the United States).  In this regard, he was
showing his Western centric bias and a misunderstanding of the importance of
METI in formulating policies for the Japanese market.  Milhaupt stated that “[i]n
this regard, METI’s role in spearheading the formulation of guidelines that led to
Japan’s embrace of Delaware is also noteworthy.  While METI’s initiative is con-
sistent with its involvement in other corporate governance in recent years, METI
is arguably not the most appropriate agency to formulate a coordinated response
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tance of METI in Japan, it is possible that the Japanese courts actu-
ally waited for the METI guidelines to be released before issuing their
decisions.168
In September 2004, METI commissioned a Corporate Value
Study Group to look at the arrival of hostile takeover bids in Japan
and to investigate the availability of United States style defensive
measures in Japan.169  The Corporate Value study group issued its re-
port in March 2005 (the “METI Interim Report”).170  The report advo-
cated the adoption of U.S. style defensive measures (including the
poison pill) because “by adopting Western style defensive measures
Japanese management will have more time and increased leverage to
negotiate with hostile suitors.”171
On May 27, 2005, METI issued its final guidelines on defensive
measures.172  These guidelines specifically acknowledge that takeover
defenses are legal in Japan and describe the circumstances under
which they will be allowed.  One of the most interesting facts in the
guidelines is that they acknowledge the “principle of protecting and
enhancing corporate value and the interests of shareholders as a
whole” [emphasis added].173  Note the language used by METI in this
policy when they refer to the interests of “shareholders as a whole” and
not in the interests of “employees.”174  The policy is the first official
acknowledgment in Japan that a shift in the corporate governance sys-
tem is occurring towards the shareholder model.  It is also an example
of the way METI melds the importation of foreign institutions with
existing Japanese practices.  This policy statement was a blend be-
tween the shareholder governance system of the United States and the
principle of shareholder equality in the Japanese Commercial Code.
to hostile takeovers.  It has no formal jurisdiction over the corporate securities
laws, and other governmental actors such as the Financial Supervisory Agency
and the Securities Exchange Surveillance Commission (a rough analogue to the
SEC) seem more appropriately situated to formulate a governmental response to
this policy issue.” Milhaupt, supra note 4, at 2211.
168 The court referred to and endorsed the METI Guidelines in its decision in
Yushemin Holdings Co. Ltd. v. Japan Engineering Consultants, July 29, 2005 (To-
kyo District Court) 1739 Commercial L. Rev. 100.
169 METI: CORPORATE VALUE STUDY GROUP, supra note 165, at 1.
170 Id. at 1.
171 Id. at 5.
172 MINISTRY OF ECONOMY, TRADE AND INDUSTRY & MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, GUIDE-
LINES REGARDING TAKEOVER DEFENSE FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROTECTION AND EN-
HANCEMENT OF CORPORATE VALUE AND SHAREHOLDER’S COMMON INTERESTS
(SUMMARY) 1 (May 27, 2005), http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/economy/keiei_innova-
tion/keizaihousei/pdf/shishin_youyaku.pdf.
173 Id.
174 Id.
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By promulgating this policy METI is playing the crucial role of adapt-
ing the foreign influences (shareholder influence) to fit the Japanese
governance system so that they are interpreted in a way that is
uniquely Japanese and also to measure the pace of the deinstitutional-
ization of the present system.
4. Government and Market Participants Play a Significant and
Active Role in “Selecting” Which Foreign Corporate Governance
Rules Will be “Adapted” into the Local Corporate
Governance Regime
This component of the theory highlights the active role that in-
dividual actors play in the process of corporate governance conver-
gence.  It highlights the fact that there is nothing inevitable about
corporate governance convergence and that actors (both individuals
and governments) can affect the pace and direction of the change.  For
the purposes of this analysis, Pitman Potter’s theory of selective adap-
tation will be used because it allows for a focus on the cultural aspects
of the choices that actors make.175  In that theory, whether a particu-
lar change will be adopted into a society depends on three elements:
perception, complimentarity, and legitimacy.176
In this case, the Japanese government has been very active
(primarily through METI) in directing the corporate governance re-
forms to increase their chances of success.  The issues in the Japanese
case are related to the complimentarity or the vast ideological differ-
ences between the existing Japanese social institutions and the foreign
institutions that are being imported.
a. Perception
The Japanese have a long history of borrowing legal institu-
tions from foreign sources.  This practice is based on the acknowledge-
ment that their own system is not well suited to internal evolutionary
growth without outside influences.  This is probably due to the fact
that its domestic institutions are so homogenous that there is little
natural variation among institutions and organizations to allow evolu-
tion when the existing structures prove inadequate for changing cir-
cumstances.177  There is also a widely held belief among Japanese
market participants and government officials that the institutions of
175 This analysis could also be presented in Milhaupt’s paradigm of telescoping
and stacking. See Milhaupt, supra note 4.
176 It should be noted however, that each of the insights discussed below could
also be framed as a Chinese social institution.
177 This is an insight that is offered by population ecology theory and evolutionary
economics from organizational analysis.  This homogeneity is also the reason why
it takes so long for changes to occur in Japan.
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the shareholder corporate governance system, including hostile take-
over bids, are a legitimate solution to the current issue of poor eco-
nomic performance of Japanese firms.  The hope is that the threat of
hostile takeover bids will provide an incentive for Japanese managers
to improve the financial performance of their firms.178  In the context
of the current corporate governance reforms, the practice of borrowing
foreign legal institutions has helped mitigate any perception issues
that may have been associated with the reforms.  Perception in the
Japanese case has also been enhanced because many Japanese law-
yers, bureaucrats and judges were educated in the United States and
are very familiar with the foreign legal institutions that are being
adapted.179
b. Complimentarity
Complimentarity is where the real problem lies in this case.
There is very little that is complimentary between the traditional Jap-
anese stakeholder corporate governance system and the new institu-
tions of the shareholder corporate governance system.  In fact, they are
opposites.  One is a system characterized by consensus and collectivity;
the other a system characterized by conflict and individualism.  This
lack of complimentarity will have two likely effects on the adaptation
process.  First, the process will continue to be a very slow progress as
market participants struggle with attempting to combine the institu-
tions from the two vastly different systems.  Second, the compromises
that will be required to adapt the two systems will mean that the cor-
porate governance system that results will not be similar to either of
the existing systems – but a new system altogether.  It will, however,
be a system that is uniquely Japanese.
c. Legitimacy
From an official standpoint there is no barrier to adaptation in
terms of legitimacy.  Most, if not all, of the major constituents in the
178 It is interesting to note that the goal of the reforms in Japan might be to create
simply the “threat” of hostile takeovers to improve financial performance without
actually instigating a wave of takeovers to sweep across the economy.  At the same
time that the government is making it possible to make hostile bids it is also lay-
ing out clear guidelines on the acceptable ways in which firms can protect them-
selves from the bids.
179 See e.g., Milhaupt, supra note 4, at 2206 (stating that “[a]s with any trans-
plant, familiarity with the foreign law among the experts responsible for interpret-
ing and enforcing it appears to have played a role in the adoption of the Takeover
Guidelines.  Delaware corporate law is familiar to many Japanese lawyers, eco-
nomic bureaucrats, and judges, many of whom have studied in U.S. law schools.
More specifically, at least one-third of the Corporate Value Study Group’s mem-
bers have extensive exposure to Delaware corporate law.”).
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Japanese economy are supportive of changes that will allow Japan to
remain competitive on a global scale.180  The government is supportive
of the changes, METI is actively directing the process and pace of the
changes, and the business elite acknowledge the need for the changes.
However, the business elite may not be as supportive of the arrival of
hostile takeover bids.  The lobbying of the Japanese business elite
delayed the effective date for the rules that would allow foreign compa-
nies to purchase Japanese companies by way of share exchange until
May 1, 2007.  There is widespread concern about making sure that Ja-
pan does not fall behind in global markets.  The only issue for adapta-
tion that may arise in the area of legitimacy is that informal norms
(social relations) are more important than formal norms (laws) in Ja-
pan.181  The result of this may be that even though the government
changes the laws to allow different business practices, those practices
may never materialize because the informal norms of Japanese busi-
ness culture remain intact.  This is just another of many indicia that
total convergence to the shareholder corporate governance system in
Japan is unlikely.
PART 7: CONCLUSION
The layered approach is better at explaining the arrival of hos-
tile takeover bids in Japan than the traditional corporate governance
convergence theories or the selective adaptation theories used on their
own.  It is able to take into account the social institutions in Japanese
society and not just Japan’s economic institutions.  Examples offered
in this article of such social institutions include the practice of borrow-
ing from foreign sources and administrative guidance.
The evidence presented in this article supports the four step
convergence process hypothesized by the layered approach: (1) eco-
nomic pressures triggered convergence; (2) corporate governance con-
vergence was more likely to occur among firms that operated in the
same field (the field was defined as firms with a large percentage of
foreign shareholders); (3) the speed and direction of convergence is af-
fected by the strength and existence of local social institutions includ-
ing borrowing from foreign sources and administrative guidance; and
(4) government and market participants and, in particular, METI are
playing a significant and active role in “selecting” which foreign insti-
tutions to adapt.
While hostile takeover bids have arrived in Japan, they have
not yet become a widely accepted Japanese business practice.  Most of
the hostile takeover bids to date were launched by a handful of
180 See Milhaupt, supra note 4, at 2204.
181 See e.g., MILHAUPT & WEST, supra note 50 (studying informal and formal rules
that shape economically integral factors).
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younger aggressive businessmen and none have yet been successful.
In fact, one man, Murakami, was behind or involved in many of the
early takeover bids, and he, along with Takafumi Hori, were jailed for
breaching securities laws.182  The fact these men have been arrested is
evidence that Japanese business culture is not yet prepared to accept
this kind of aggressive business practice.  For example, there has been
talk that Lehman, because of its role in the Livedoor bid, could have
problems finding new clients in Japan.183
This article suggests that shareholder influence will continue
to grow in Japan.  More companies will adopt the new corporate struc-
ture and shareholder activism will become more prevalent.  However,
this article also suggests that there will not be a convergence towards
the Anglo-American shareholder governance system and that, because
of social and institutional pressures, there will likely be a blending of
the stakeholder governance system with the shareholder governance
system into something uniquely Japanese.184  In conclusion, it appears
that sociologist Neil Fligstein’s assertion may still prove to be true:
“[t]here is no market for corporate control in Japan, and there is not
likely to be one.”185
182 See Takahara, supra note 11.  Murakami’s M&A Consulting was involved in 4
of the first 9 hostile takeover bids in Japan.  See the Summary of Bids provided at
the end of the article.
183 Hostile Takeovers: Shaking up Corporate Japan, supra note 15.  In fact, Mr.
Eisuke Sakakibara, a former top finance ministry official resigned from the Leh-
man advisory boards because of the controversy surrounding the bid.
184 See generally Patrick, supra note 83; WESTNEY, supra note 81.
185 FLIGSTEIN, supra note 2, at 187.
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TABLE 3
THE NIKKEI AVERAGE 1996-2006193
SUMMARY OF HOSTILE TAKEOVER BIDS IN JAPAN
No. Year Parties Involved Summary
1. 1999 Cable and Between May 7 and June 15, 1999, Cable and
Wireless (U.K.) Wireless made a hostile bid for International
Digital Communications (“IDC”). Cable and
International Wireless made the bid after IDC proposed a
Digital stock swap with NTT.  Cable and Wireless
Communications was able to get 97% of the shares.
2. 2000 Boehringer Boehringer made an unsolicited offer for SSP.
Ingelheim While the bid was unsuccessful, Boehringer
(Germany) was able to increase its stake from 20% to
36% giving it a blocking position and effective
SS control.
Pharmaceuticals
(“SSP”)
3. 2000 M&A Consulting M&A Consulting made a hostile bid for Shoei
Corporation.  It was unsuccessful because a
Shoei Corporation friendly shareholder stepped in.
4. 2002 M&A Consulting In 2002, M&A waged an unsuccessful proxy
battle over the dividend policy at Tokyo Style.
Tokyo Style
5. 2003 Steel Partners On December 19, 2003, Steel Partners Japan
Japan (a U.S. investment fund) (“SPJ”) made a
(U.S. Investment hostile takeover bid for 33% of the shares of
Fund) Sotoh.  Sotoh had no debt and a significant
193 BMO Investorline, https://www.bmoinvestorline.com/ILClientWeb/marketing/
marketingChart.do.
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amount of liquid assets (¥20B).  NIF (a
Sotoh company affiliated with Daiwa securities)
responded by making a white knight bid.  SPJ
raised its bid and offered to buy 100% of the
shares.  NIF dropped out.  Sotoh responded by
raising its dividend from ¥13 to ¥200.  The
stock soared as a result of the dividend
increase and SPJ’s bid was ultimately
unsuccessful.  SPJ then sold its entire position
for approx. ¥2B yen profit.
6. 2003 Steel Partners On December 19, 2003, SPJ made a hostile
Japan takeover bid for Yushiro Chemical Industries.
(U.S. Investment Yushiro had a large cash position and a
Fund) history of paying low dividends.  The attempt
was also unsuccessful because Yushiro raised
Yushiro Chemical its dividend.
Industries
7. 2005 Livedoor Co. On February 8, 2005, Livedoor Co. Ltd.
(“Livedoor”) a small Internet service provider
Nippon attempted a takeover of Nippon Broadcasting
Broadcasting Company (“Nippon”) a radio broadcasting firm
Company affiliated with Japan’s largest media
conglomerate, the Fuji Sankei media group.
The situation started because Nippon owned
22.5% of the shares of its parent (Fuji TV) but
Fuji TV owned only 12.5% of Nippon shares.
On January 17, 2005, to cure the anomalous
share ownership situation, Fuji TV made an
offer for 100% of the shares of Nippon.  In the
middle of the process Livedoor made the
surprising announcement that it had acquired
38% of Nippon and that it intended to make
an offer for 100% of the shares.  Livedoor had
made its purchases in after hours trading and
was able to bypass the early warning
reporting requirements.194  The share
purchases by Livedoor were financed by an
issuance of $750 million “death spiral”
convertible bonds underwritten by U.S.
investment bank Lehman Brothers.  The
death spiral bonds allowed Lehman the right
to convert the bonds into shares at a constant
discount to the share price.  On February 23,
2005, the board of Nippon responded by
issuing a substantial number of warrants
(shin kabu yoyaku ken) to Fuji TV to dilute
Livedoor back down below 20%.  The rationale
for the warrants was that they ensured that
Nippon would remain with the Fuji Sankei
group which would provide long-term benefits
to shareholders.  Livedoor then sued to enjoin
194 This loop-hole has since been fixed.
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the issuance of the warrants and was
successful.  The situation was eventually
resolved amicably on April 18, 2005 when
Livedoor sold all of its Nippon shares to Fuji
TV for about what it bought them for and in
return Fuji TV purchased a 2.5% stake in
Livedoor and the three companies established
a joint committee to explore related ventures.
8. 2005 Yushemin In July 2005, Yushemin Holdings launched a
Holdings Co. Ltd. hostile takeover bid for Japan Engineering
Consultants (“JEC”).  The board of JEC
Japan engaged in a number of defensive measures
Engineering including a stock split that were challenged in
Consultants court.  The court rejected the defensive
measures.  In doing so, it referenced the METI
Takeover Guidelines.  The bid was eventually
unsuccessful because few shareholders
tendered to the bid.
9. 2005 M&A Consulting On September 28, 2005, M&A Consulting
disclosed that it had acquired a major stake in
Hanshin Electric Hanshin Electric Railway and Hanshin
Railway Co. Ltd. Department Store.  M&A Consulting
continued to purchase shares in Hanshin
Hankyu Holdings, Railway through May 10, 2006 when it held
Inc. 46% of the shares.  On May 2, 2006, it made a
shareholder’s proposal to appoint its nominees
at the shareholders meeting scheduled for
June 29, 2006.
In all its disclosure documents, the fund had
been disclosing the purpose of the investment
in Hanshin as “pure investment.”  In fact, it
had been proposing a management buyout
accompanied by other transactions.  On May
22, 2006, it corrected the disclosures to read
“participation to management.”
In order to escape M&A Consulting, Hanshin
arranged a competing takeover by a
competing railway company: Hankyu Holdings
Inc.  On April 23, 2006, Hankyu Holdings
announced that it was considering purchasing
all of the shares of Hanshin Electric Railway.
10. 2006 Oiji Paper Co. On August 1, 2006, Oiji Paper, Japan’s largest
paper maker, announced its intention to make
Hokuetsu Paper a hostile bid for Hokuetsu Paper.  The value
Mills Ltd. of the transaction was $1.45 billion dollars
(165 billion yen).  This bid was the first ever
hostile bid between two Japanese market
participants that was not influenced by a
foreign party or a member of the “Hills Gang.”
On August 3, 2006, Hokuetsu responded by
issuing a 24.4% stake of shares to friendly
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Mitsubishi Corp. and Nippon Paper Group at
a discount.
The bid expired unsuccessful on September 4,
2006.  Oiji had acquired only 5.4% of the
shares of Hokuetsu.
11. 2006 Aoki Holdings Inc. On August 7, 2006, Aoki Holdings made a
hostile takeover bid for Menswear maker
Futata Co. Futata Co.  On August 19, 2006, Fututa
responded by being acquired by its largest
shareholder Konaka Co.
12. 2006 Steel Partners In October of 2006, Steel Partners launched a
tender offer for Myojo Foods.
Myojo Foods Co.
In November of 2006, Nissin Foods announced
Nissin Food that it will buy a 33.4% stake in Myojo Foods.
Products Co. Steel Partners tendered to Nissin’s bid.
13. 2007 Davinci Advisors In April to May of 2007, TOC management
KK made an unsuccessful buyout bid at a 4%
premium.
TOC Co.
In July of 2007, Davinci, a major shareholder,
made an unsolicited bid at approx. 1,300 yen.
On July 24, 2007, Davinci abandoned the bid
after only 34% of the shares were tendered.
14. 2007 Steel Partners In May of 2007, Steel Partners announced a
bid for Bull-Dog Sauce, a maker of Worcester
Bull-Dog Sauce Sauce.
Co.
Bull-Dog responded on June 7th by
announcing that it would hold a special
meeting June 24th to approve the issuance of
warrants that would dilute Steel Partners
interest.
On June 15th, Steel Partners raised its bid to
1,700 yen per share from 1584 yen.
The warrant issued was approved by 80% of
the shareholders at the meeting and the
warrants were issued July 11th.  The
warrants diluted Steel Partner’s interest down
to 3% from 10% and paid Steel Partners 2.3
billion yen.  It was the first time a poison pill
had been triggered in Japan.
Steel Partners challenged the legality of the
action by seeking an injunction on the
issuance of the warrants.  The legal battle
went to the Supreme Court which upheld
Bull-Dog’s right to issue the warrants.  Along
the way, the High Court referred to Steel
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Partners as an “abusive acquirer.”
Steel Partners admitted defeat after only
acquiring 4.4% stake.
15. 2007 Steel Partners Steel Partners had been a shareholder of
Sapporo since 2004.
Sapporo
In 2007, Steel Partners offered to buy a
majority stake.  Sapporo rejected the offer and
introduced takeover defense measures.  Steel
Partners responded by launching a bid to buy
up to 33% of the shares.
In 2008, Steel Partners withdrew the bid.
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